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PROOF OF DISPARATE TREATMENT
UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT: VARIATIONS ON A
TITLE VII THEME
Mack A. Player*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) I was en-
acted in 1967 and substantially amended in 1974 and 1978. Gener-
ally stated, the ADEA prohibits employer discrimination by public
and private "employers" (persons having twenty or more employ-
ees), labor unions, and employment agencies. Protection against
age discrimination is granted, however, only to employees and ap-
plicants between the ages of forty and seventy.2 It is illegal to dis-
criminate on the basis of age against persons within the forty-to-
seventy age group regardless of whether the person favored by the
discrimination is within or without the protected age group or is
younger or older than the plaintiff.3 The ADEA does provide as
defenses age distinctions based on a "bona fide occupational quali-
fication reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the partic-
ular business' 4 and age distinctions made pursuant to bona fide
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Drury College, A.B., 1963; University of Mis-
souri, J.D., 1965; George Washington University, LL.M.L, 1972.
1 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U..C. §§ 621-634 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
3 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1981). The Federal Government is not a defined "em-
ployer" but is required to take personnel actions "free from any discrimination based on
age." Id. § 633a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
3 See Smith v. World Book-Childcraft Int'l, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 96, 99-102 (N.D. IMI. 1980);
29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1982).
4 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1) (1976).
[Tihe burden is on the employer to show (1) that the bfoq [bona fide occupational
qualification] which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business
... and (2) that the employer has reasonable cause, i.e., a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons within the class... would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or imprac-
tical to deal with persons over the age limit on an individualized basis.
Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); ef. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499
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seniority systems.5 The Act also permits allocation of benefits ac-
cording to bona fide retirement and insurance programs. 6 In addi-
F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974) (to extent hiring policy effectuates safety goals, it is necessary
to the essence of operations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). As applied to mandatory
age limit on hiring pilots, compare Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307-08 (4th
Cir. 1981) (BFOQ not established), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982), with Murnano v.
American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (BFOQ established; age qualification
valid), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982). As to mandatory retirement of pilots, compare
Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1982) (BFOQ for retirement at age
60 not established), with Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. TWA, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,298
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), and Hollelman v. Conservation Dep't, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1104 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (BFOQ established). As applied to firefighters, see Orzel v. City of
Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1983), and EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671
F.2d 1162, 1167 (8th Cir. 1982). As applied to law enforcement, see EEOC v. County of
Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6
(1982); Player, Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misinterpre-
tation, Misdirection and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REV. 747, 751-67 (1978).
5 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981); see also Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096,
1102-03 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1978); Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut.
Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Minn. 1971); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (1982), Player, supra
note 4, at 779-81; cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1784 (1982); California
Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-09 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343-56 (1977) (interpreting a similar provision under Title VII).
6 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981). This section specifically provides, however, that
,.no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such
seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement
of any individual ... because of the age of such individual. . . ." Id. An exception to the
prohibition on mandatory retirement is imposed upon bona fide executives over the age of
65 who received vested retirement of at least $27,000 annually. Id. § 631(c); see Zises v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1218 (D. Mass. 1982). The prohibitions
against involuntary retirement made pursuant to a plan were enacted through a 1978
amendment to the ADEA. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (Supp. V 1981)). This amendment was a reaction to United
Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977), which had permitted such retirement. Scc
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
Effective January 1, 1983, the following proviso was added to the ADEA to be codified as
29 U.S.C. § 623(g):
(1) For purposes of this section, any employer must provide that any employee
aged 65 through 69 shall be entitled to coverage under any group health plan offered
to such employees under the same conditions as any employee under age 65.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "group health plan" has the meaning
given to such term in section 162(i)(2) of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954].
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 116(a), 96 Stat. 324,
353 (1982) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(g) (West 1982)).
For discussion of the permissible distinctions that may be made in employee benefit
plans, see 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1982). Generally stated, benefits may be reduced on the basis
of an employee's age so long as that reduction is based on actuarial costs. An employee
cannot be compelled, however, to make greater contributions in order to retain the same
benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(i) (1982); see Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263,
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tion, the ADEA specifically permits employees to be disciplined for
"good cause"7 and permits distinctions based on "reasonable fac-
tors other than age."'
The ADEA has its legislative roots near those of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Much of the operative, substantive lan-
guage of the ADEA was drawn from that previously found in Title
VII.10 Because of this similarity the courts have indicated that as a
general proposition Title VII and ADEA litigation should follow a
parallel course.1
1267-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. CL 2239 (1982); C. SuLLIvAN, M. Zt.ssR & R. RiCH-
ARDs, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DiscmiumAsnoN § 11.5 (1980).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1976).
* Id. § 623(f)(1).
* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17. In debating Title VII it was suggested that "age" be
protected along with race, sex, national origin, and religion. That suggestion was rejected,
but Congress in Title VII specifically directed the Secretary of Labor to study the problem
of age discrimination in employment and to recommend legislative action. The report of the
Secretary of Labor, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AmuCAN Woiuau AGE DSLSCRzMIA-
TION iN EMPLOYMENT (1965), and the subsequent recommendation resulted in the ADEA.
See H.P. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 2213, 2214. This history was documented in more detail in EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S.
Ct. 1054, 1057-59 (1983). See generally EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HSTORY OF THE AGE: Dmcmw-
NATION IN EMPLOYM.aT AcT (1981) [hereinafter cited as EEOC]. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted the close relationship between Title VII and the ADEA. See Oscar Mayer
& Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1978).
10 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976). Both sections
proscribe certain employer practices. Title VII states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The ADEA states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
12 E.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1004-16 (1st Cir. 1979); see also EEOC v.
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II. ESTABLISHING ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION
A. Adverse Impact: Violations Absent Illegal Motive
Title VII litigation has evolved in two distinct classes of
cases-"adverse impact"12 and "disparate treatment."13 Adverse-
impact analysis requires the plaintiff initially to prove, usually
through statistical data, that a particular rule or criterion used by
the defendant to select employees disproportionately affects em-
ployment opportunities of a class of persons protected by the stat-
ute.1 4 If, but only if, the plaintiff establishes the adverse impact of
the rule on the plaintiff's class, the burden is shifted to the defen-
dant to prove that the challenged rule is required by "business ne-
cessity." Failure of the defendant to prove the "necessity" of the
rule in terms of the rule's "manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question" will result in a judgment for the plaintiff.15 That
the defendant was motivated solely by business concerns and had
no actual intent or motivation to harm plaintiff or the class to
which plaintiff belongs is not a defense and does not entitle defen-
dant to a judgment. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mecha-
nisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." 6
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057-59 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (the Court in a Title VII case cited with approval the ADEA case of
Loeb v. Textron, Inc.).
" See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); Allison v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 1982).
,S See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). Adverse impact analy-
sis will be utilized when a general rule is applied uniformly to a broad class of applicants or
employees. It is usually an objective rule or criterion. Disparate treatment involves individu-
alized evaluation of a particular individual. Judgments may often be made by utilizing vari-
able criteria or individualized judgments and reasons. See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank,
698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-74
(11th Cir. 1982); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982).
" Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979).
15 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). This burden is one
of persuasion, and not merely an evidentiary obligation to present evidence of "necessity."
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190.91 (4th Cir. 1982); Contreras v. City of Los Ange.
les, 656 F.2d 1267, 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
16 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Actions arising under 42 U.S.C. §
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Even if the rule having the adverse impact is proved to be "nec-
essary," the plaintiff may still prove that the rule was imposed for
the purpose of harming the plaintiff or his class. At this point Me-
gal motivation is relevant and will establish a violation of the
Act.17
Whether adverse-impact analysis developed under Title VII for
race, sex, and national origin discrimination is applicable to ADEA
actions is unclear.1 ' That issue, albeit an important one, is beyond
the scope of this Article. "
B. Disparate Treatment: Motivation and the Problem of Its
Proof
Disparate-treatment cases generally involve decisions to dis-
charge, refuse to hire, or decline promotion to a single individual.'
Some cases may also involve intentional imposition of differences
in salary or working conditions.20 Disparate treatment requires a
1983 or § 1981, however, require that the plaintiff prove motivation. General Bldg. Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982); Washington v. Davis, 426 US. 229, 245
(1976).
17 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
Is Language in the ADEA, not found in Title VII, that allows employers to utilize "rea-
sonable factors other than age," 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976), suggests that impact analysis
might not be appropriate. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1607 (1982), detail concepts of adverse impact and the validation of selection pro-
cedures. Expressly, these Guidelines do not apply to the ADEA. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2D (1982).
Further, former interpretative guidelines from the Department of Labor indicated only that
rules falling disproportionately upon particular age groups would be "carefully scrutinized"
for improper motivation but significantly omitted any requirement that such rules be mani-
festly related to particular job requirements. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.104(b) (1982). The EEOC,
however, has taken the position that impact analysis is appropriate under the ADEA. The
new guidelines provide:
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for different
treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds that it is a
"factor other than" age, and such a practice has an adverse impact on individuals
within the protected age group, it can only be justified as a business necessity. Tests
which are asserted as "reasonable factors other than age" will be scrutinized in accor-
dance with the standards set forth at Part 1607 of this Title.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1982). A number of courts have held that impact analysis is appropri-
ate under the ADEA. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th
Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); EEOC v.
Borden's, Inc., 30 Fair Empl Prac. Cas. (BNA) 933 (D. Ariz. 1982).
19 EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 638-39 (4th Cir. 1983); Pouncy v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 1982).
10 See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 163-64 (1981) (female guards al-
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showing that the plaintiff was treated differently because of his
membership in a class protected by the statute. Disparate treat-
ment may be apparent on the face of the classification itself. For
example, refusal to hire women with preschool-aged children, with-
out imposing the same limitation on male applicants, is an act of
disparate treatment of women.2 ' Discharging employees of one race
for misconduct tolerated in employees of another race is another
form of patent or facial disparate treatment.2 2 A pension plan that
requires females to pay more into the fund, or receive less of a
periodic annuity upon retirement, is disparate treatment of female
employees.23 In these situations there is no need to inquire into the
employer's motivation because the proscribed criteria are found on
the face of the treatment itself.
Similar results are reached under ADEA. An employer who re-
quires older workers to satisfy special physical or mental tests that
are not required of other age groups is engaging in illegal disparate
treatment on the basis of age.24 Similarly, an employer may not
pay workers different benefits based upon their age.25 It is also ille-
gal disparate treatment to discipline an older worker for miscon-
duct tolerated in younger employees." Note that the ADEA, how-
ever, unlike Title VII, provides that differentiation may be made
on the basis of age pursuant to bona fide benefit plans such as
retirement, pension, or insurance.27
When applicants or employees are denied opportunities not pa-
tently based on classifications proscribed by the statute, the issue
evolves into one of the defendant's motivation for making the deci-
sion. Motivation, however, is a subtle element that is difficult to
prove. The plaintiff may have little direct evidence of the defen-
legedly received lower pay than male guards pursuant to intentionally discriminatory sys-
tem; if intent is proved a Title VII violation will be established).
1, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
22 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976).
23 See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
", Department of Labor Interpretations on Age Discrimination in Employment, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 860.103(f)(1), .104(b) (1982).
" Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.) (denial of sick leave pay to retiring
workers), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2239 (1982).
26 Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1979).
27 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See generally Germann v. Levy, 553 F. Supp. 700,
703-04 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (existence of a bona fide insurance plan is a valid defense to a charge
of age discrimination). The plan, however, may not be used to refuse employment or forco
retirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
626 [Vol. 17:621
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dant's motivation, but as a member of a class traditionally sub-
jected to discrimination, the plaintiff may believe that the decision
was motivated by statutorily proscribed criteria (race, sex, religion,
national origin, or age). The defendant, however, may deny that
the proscribed criteria played any role in the treatment of the
plaintiff and could present reasons for taking the particular action
against the plaintiff. The issue is thereby joined: Was the defen-
dant motivated by factors made illegal by the statute? The method
under Title VII of addresiing and resolving this issue was set forth
in broad outline by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.28
III. THE TITLE VII MODEL
A. The Basic Structure
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green created a flexible system of
proof based upon the proposition that from the existence of certain
objective facts inferences can be created that bear on the issue of
motivation. Direct evidence of illegal motivation is not required.
The initial burden is placed upon the plaintiff who can establish a
prima facie case of illegally motivated action by proving the exis-
tence of six elements: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a class protected
by the statute; (2) the defendant has a job vacancy and was seek-
ing applicants; (3) the plaintiff was qualified to perform the job;
(4) the plaintiff applied for the job; (5) the plaintiff was not hired;
and (6) the defendant continued to seek applicants for the va-
cancy.29 From this showing flows "an inference of discrimination
...because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
- 411 U.S. 792 (1973). When direct evidence of improper motivation is presented, how-
ever, it is not necessary to utilize the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Blackwell v. Sun Elec.
Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769,
774 (11th Cir. 1982).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court actually listed four elements-
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority, (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. Under the second factor the Court combined three distinct factual elements: (a) applica-
tion, (b) qualification of plaintiff, and (c) vacancy. Yet each of those is a distinct element
that must be separately established by plaintiff.
1983]
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factors. 30
The Court has indicated that these McDonnell Douglas ele-
ments of a prima facie case are guidelines and are not "intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."31 Consequently, these ele-
ments have been modified and adapted for use in cases involving
discharges and the denial of transfers or promotions.32 Since an ap-
plication for promotion is essentially the same as a job application,
cases that involve the denial of transfers and promotions will fol-
low the McDonnell Douglas model. Discharge cases present some-
what different problems. In those cases the plaintiff generally must
prove that she was a member of a class traditionally subjected to
discrimination, was performing satisfactory work for the defen-
dant, and was discharged and that the employer sought to fill the
vacancy or utilized nonminority persons to perform the workY'
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the McDonnell
Douglas decision teaches that the "burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection. 34 Mere denial of improper motiva-
tion will not suffice. Failure of the defendant to articulate a "rea-
son" that is "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory" will result in a
judgment, as a matter of law, for the plaintiff.35 This occurs be-
cause when "all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have
30 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
31 Id.
' See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251-53 (1981). In Bur-
dine, the plaintiff was denied a promotion and fired when her employer reorganized the
plaintiff's department. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas elements and concluded
that the plaintiff had proved her prima facie case. Id. at 253 n.6; see also United States
Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 51 U.S.L.W. 4354, 4355 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1983); Board of Trustees of
Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (promotion case accepting general prin-
ciples of McDonnell Douglas); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977). Some courts do
not require any showing that the employer sought to fill the vacancy. See EEOC v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,
1253 (8th Cir. 1981).
3, 411 U.S. at 802.
" There was some early suggestion that an unrefuted prima facie case merely allowed a
finding on behalf of plaintiff but did not require the trial court to render a judgment for
plaintiff. See Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474, 478 (10th Cir. 1976). In Burdine, however,
the Court held that an unrefuted prima facie showing required the trial court to enter judg-
ment for the plaintiff. 450 U.S. at 254. The inference of illegal motive at this point Is
"mandatory" rather than "permissive." See Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969 (9th Cir.
1982); Miller v. WFLI Radio, Inc., 687 F.2d 136, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 17:621
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been eliminated [or none articulated] ... it is more likely than
not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration.""8
If the defendant fulfills the burden of "articulating" a "reason"
that is "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory," then the plaintiff
bears the burden of presenting additional evidence of illegal moti-
vation that goes beyond the bare objective elements necessary for
the initial prima facie showing. The defendant will be entitled to a
judgment, as a matter of law, if the plaintiff produces no such ad-
ditional evidence.3 7 McDonnell Douglas indicated that additional
evidence of illegal motivation might consist of proof that the rea-
son articulated was not uniformly applied, that the defendant had
expressed specific prejudice against the plaintiff's class, or that the
defendant's general employment practices show a discriminatory
pattern.
Should the plaintiff present additional evidence, over and above
the prima facie elements, the ultimate factual issue of motivation
is joined. The trial court must then examine all the evidence
presented and determine whether the defendant was motivated by
consideration made illegal by the statute.39
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis in original).
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56; cf. Tribble v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool
Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir.) (suggesting in ADEA case that defendant's articulation
merely avoids a directed verdict for plaintiff, that a jury issue is framed by the reason, and
that a jury verdict for the plaintiff will be affirmed even absent additional pretext evidence),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
"411 U.S. at 804-05. A formalistic "three-step minuet" with the plaintiff making a prima
facie showing, followed by the defendant's presentation of legitimate reasons that in turn
allows the plaintiff to present evidence of pretext, is one method of proceeding. Neverthe-
less, a trial court controls the order of proof. FED. . Evm. 61L Thus, a court could require a
plaintiff to present all of his evidence of illegal motivation at one time and permit rebuttal
only for direct refutations of defendant's evidence. See Holden v. Commission Against Dis-
crimination, 671 F.2d 30, 36 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 97 (1982); Flowers v. Crouch-
Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977). In such a case the plaintiff might be
required to combine steps one and three.
See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 51 U.S.L.W. 4354, 4356 (US. Apr. 4, 1933).
The Court in Aikens held that even if a McDonnell Douglas showing of a prima facie case
was not made, when direct or circumstantial evidence of illegal motivation was presented
and defendant articulated a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason," the trial court should
resolve the factual issue of motivation. Id. at 4355.
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B. Expanding the McDonnell Douglas Model
1. "Burden to Articulate": Sweeney and Burdine. McDonnell
Douglas indicated that upon a prima facie showing by the plaintiff
the burden must shift to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason. The Court failed, however, to ex-
plain the meaning of the defendant's "burden to articulate." On
one hand, the term "burden" could suggest a burden of proof-a
risk of nonpersuasion.'0 On the other hand, the term "articulate"
could suggest nothing more onerous than a need "to state" or "to
utter. ' 1 Board of Trustees v. Sweeney' 2 resolved one aspect of
this ambiguity. The Court held that the "burden" on the defen-
dant imposed by the McDonnell Douglas model was not a burden
to prove that the articulated reason actually motivated the em-
ployment action.43 A prima facie showing did not shift the ultimate
risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of motivation to the defendant.
Rather the ultimate burden of proving motivation remained
throughout with the plaintiff."
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine further
clarified the nature of the defendant's obligation by rejecting the
alternative suggestion that the "burden to articulate" required no
40 See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977).
The employer generally must prove the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Id. The Turner court rejected a standard that would require clear
and convincing evidence. Id. The court also rejected the argument that simple articulation
would carry the employer's burden because of the potentiality that she may articulate a
fictitious but nonetheless nondiscriminatory explanation. If the burden were one of articula-
tion, the plaintiff possibly could be forced to respond and prove that the articulated reason
was merely a pretext for discrimination. The court stated that the plaintiff must be allowed
to challenge the factual validity of the employer's proffered reasons. Id.
The distinction between articulation and proof was later questioned by Justice Stevens in
Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens argued that articulation was synonomous with proof, and therefore would regard
the distinction made by the court in Turner to be "illusory." Id. at 28.
"' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 124
(unabr. 1967): "To utter distinctly."
42 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
43 Id. at 25.
44 Id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court thus rejected Professor Morgan's theory
that a presumption flowing from a prima facie case shifts to the defendant a risk of nonper-
suasion on the fact presumed. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANOLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LTIGATION 80-81 (1956); see 9 J. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 2493 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
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more than stating or pleading a reason.45 The Court stated that
"the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of
admissible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection. The ex-
planation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment
for the defendant."'4 In a significant footnote the Court continued:
"An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus,
the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to
the complaint or by argument of counsel."' 7
Thus the defendant's immediate obligation in meeting a prima
facie showing is not a burden of proving legal motivation, but
rather it is an evidentiary obligation to "come forward" with evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding that the articulated reason
existed. If the articulated reason is found to exist, a factfinder may
infer that the reason motivated the employment action. 8
2. "Reasons That Are Legitimate". McDonnell Douglas,
Furnco, and Burdine. The Court in McDonnell Douglas rejected
the position of the plaintiff that a "reason" must rise to the level of
a "business necessity" before it could be considered "legitimate.' '
A "reason" can be "legitimate" even in the absence of a close rela-
tionship between the "reason" and job performance. In McDonnell
Douglas the reason given by the employer for not rehiring a black
former employee was that the employee, while laid off, had en-
gaged in an illegal trespass against the employer during a civil
rights demonstration. The Supreme Court held that the employer
was free not to "rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate,
unlawful activity against it," even though the "reason" was not
"necessary" for the job and did not directly relate to the plaintiff's
job performance."
" 450 U.S. at 257.
4 Id. at 255.
47 Id. at 255 n.9.
43 The defendant's burden is to establish the factual existence of the objective reason
articulated. See Lanpear v. Prokop, 31 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,481 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller v. WFLI Radio, Inc., 687
F.2d 136, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1982). Contra Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale In-
dep. School Dist. No. 622, 663 F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Sanchez v. Texas
Comnm'n on Alcoholism, 660 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1981).
9 411 U.S. at 803-04. The circuit court below, citing Griggs, had rejected the defendant's
reason because it lacked the necessary "substantial relationship" to actual or projected job
performance. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 344 (8th Cir. 1972). In re-
versing, the Supreme Court necessarily rejected the "business necessity" standard.
50 411 U.S. at 804.
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In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters the Court expanded
upon this proposition by holding that the existence of "better" de-
vices or "lesser discriminatory alternatives" does not undercut the
legitimacy of the reason articulated. 51 In Furnco the defendant ar-
ticulated as its reason for not employing plaintiffs that they were
"walk-on" applicants and unknown to the job superintendent.2
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of plaintiff as lacking
legitimacy because there were methods of selection other than the
"no-walk-on" rule that would serve the employer's goals equally
well, but would have less foreseeable adverse effect on minority ap-
plicants.5 3 The Court stated:
[T]he burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of
proving that he based his employment decision on a legiti-
mate consideration. . . . To prove that, he need not prove
that he pursued the course which would both enable him to
achieve his own business goal and allow him to consider the
most employment applications. Title VII. . . does not impose
a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of
minority employees."
The Court did not reject the relevance of factors such as "better
methods" or "lesser discriminatory alternatives" but indicated that
their relevance goes to the issue of pretext.55
Recently the Court indicated that prior refusals of lateral trans-
fer offers that would have provided additional experience were a
legitimate reason for not promoting a minority applicant.58
The Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine7
Court elaborated further on the concepts of "legitimacy." The
Court of Appeals in Burdine had suggested that when the defen-
dant's "reason" for rejecting the plaintiff was that another appli-
cant had superior qualifications, a burden was upon the defendant
to prove that the person selected was better qualified than the
51 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
S2 Id. at 571.
53 Id. at 578.
Id. at 577-78 (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 578.
See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 51 U.S.L.W. 4354, 4355 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1983),
57 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
632 [Vol. 17:621
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plaintiff." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defen-
dant's burden to articulate a legitimate reason did not require
proof that the plaintiff's objective qualifications were inferior to
those of the person selected. 9 The Court stated that "the em-
ployer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates,
provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria."6 0
The holding in Burdine is ambiguous in that it did not totally
discount the use of comparative evidence to disprove the legiti-
macy of the proffered reason. All the Court held was that an em-
ployer had the right to choose between equally qualified persons
on other legitimate grounds and need not prove the superiority of
the person who was selected over the plaintiff.61 Thus, evidence
proving that the person selected was actually inferior (not equal)
to plaintiff in terms of posted qualifications and that defendant
had no other reason for the selection of the "inferior" person still
might be grounds for holding that the proffered reason lacked le-
gitimacy. That issue remains unresolved. 2 The Court indicated,
Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979), Va-
cated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
11 450 U.S. at 259-60.
6Id. at 259.
61 Id. at 259-60.
62 Some courts of appeals have held that even if it appears that plaintiff has qualifica-
tions superior to those of the person favored, this fact does not undercut the legitimacy of
the defendant's articulated reason of relative qualifications. The defendant may still prevail
Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale Indep. School Dist., 663 F.2d 65 (8th Cir.
1981) (en banc); Sanchez v. Texas Comm'n on Alcoholism, 660 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1981);
St. Peter v. Secretary of the Army, 659 F.2d 1133, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1016 (1982). These holdings appear to ignore the statement in Burdine that defen-
dcant's evidence must be sufficient to "allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the
employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." 450 U.S. at 257. If
the reason given by the defendant is the inferiority of the plaintiff's qualifications, but the
evidence in fact convinces the factfinder of the superiority of plaintiff's qualifications, and
no further justification is given, the evidence would not seem to be legally sufficient to "al-
low the trier of fact to conclude that the decision had not been motivated by discriminatory
animus." From this evidence there is nothing upon which a factfinder could infer that the
relative qualifications of the applicants, rather than illegal factors, motivated the decision.
Some authority appears to agree with this analysis by holding that when the defendant'a
"reason" was the plaintiff's relatively inferior qualifications, and the plaintiff establishes her
superior qualifications as defined by the employer, this proof will destroy the legitimacy of
defendant's articulated reason. Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1982); see
also Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 990 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that defen-
dant who relies on relative qualifications of the applicants must show that the employee
selected over plaintiff was at least equally qualified), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2233 (1982).
Many courts have simply confused Burdine. See, e.g., Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698
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however, that evidence of comparative qualifications, regardless of
the ultimate role of such evidence in determining the legitimacy of
the defendant's articulated reason, was relevant to demonstrate
the pretextual nature of the defendant's articulated reason.03
IV. THE McDonnell Douglas MODEL APPLIED TO THE ADEA
A. Step One: The Plaintiff's Burden: The Basic Prima Facie
Showing
1. Generally: McDonnell Douglas Stated and Restated: Survey
of the Circuits. The ADEA, unlike Title VII, provides for trial by
jury." The statutes are also somewhat different in language.," De-
spite these differences, courts agree that the model developed in
Title VII nonjury, disparate treatment litigation should inspire and
direct the obligations and order of proof in ADEA actions.00 How
F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (11th Cir. 1983); Ray v. Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 997 (1981).
63 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258; see Grano v. Department of Dev., 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir.
1983); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1983); Burrus v. United
Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342-43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 491 (1982). If objective
qualifications of the plaintiff are superior, it is very difficult to justify a choice utilizing
subjective standards. Subjectivity in such a case strongly suggests pretext. Some courts have
even suggested that if the employer articulates "superior qualifications of the person se-
lected" as its reason, and plaintiff's qualifications are found to be in fact superior to those of
the person selected, then the articulated reason is necessarily, as a matter of law, a pretext.
See Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 399 (10th Cir. 1983); Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 603
F.2d 477, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982); Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 555 F. Supp.
330, 335-36 (D. Colo. 1983); Little v. Master-Bilt Prods., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 901, 903 (N.D.
Miss. 1981). A holding that proof of superior qualifications establishes, as a matter of law,
the pretextual use of the reason is tantamount to holding that proof of superior qualifica.
tions establishes the lack of legal sufficiency of defendant's articulated reason of "qualifica-
tions." In either case the same proof entitles the plaintiff to a judgment as a matter of law.
See generally Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VmD. L. Rav. 1205, 1235-47 (1981).
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981). There is no right to a jury trial, however, in
ADEA actions filed against federal employers. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168-69
(1981). In Lehman the Court held that when the United States consents to be sued, the
plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial only if such a right was part of the consent. Id. at 160.
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Savage
Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d
528, 531 (9th Cir. 1981); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 945 (1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1980); McCorstin v.
United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062,
1066 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1979);
Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
634
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the prima facie case should be restated in the context of the
ADEA, however, has divided the courts into three major blocks.
The restatement that most precisely tracks the language of Mc-
Donnell Douglas is found in the Eighth Circuit:
[A] plaintiff may establish a prima facie case... by showing
(1) that he or she is within a protected age group, (2) that he
or she met applicable job qualifications, (3) that despite these
qualifications, he or she was discharged [or not hired], and
[thereafter] the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applications from persons with similar
qualifications. 7
Similar, but simpler, is the standard used in the First and
Fourth Circuits. In situations involving applications for a job open-
ing under this standard, plaintiffs satisfy their burden of produc-
tion if they show that they are members of a protected class and
that they were rejected for job vacancies for which they were quali-
fied." ' Where the plaintiff was discharged, rather than denied em-
ployment, these courts revised the standard to reflect that differ-
ence. The plaintiff must show that he was within the protected age
group of forty to seventy, that at the time of the discharge he was
574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Schmid v. Frosch, 680 F.2d 248, 251 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (standard for use of statistical data to prove discrimination is identical in Title VII
and ADEA case); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir.
1980) (McDonnell Douglas criteria applied to ADEA action), cert. denied, 450 US. 959
(1981).
For many years the Sixth Circuit stood alone in refusing to accept the McDonnell Doug-
las model for establishing a prima facie showing of age motivation. The court demanded
some direct evidence of motivation. See Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1116, 1118 n.3
(6th Cir. 1980); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975). In Ackerman v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982), the court continued to reject the
McDonnell Douglas approach as "binding," but suggested that it could serve as a useful,
nonbinding guide to analysis. Id. at 69-70. Finally, however, in Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp.,
696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit appeared to accept the basic structure of
McDonnell Douglas as being applicable to ADEA cases. Id. at 1179. Although recognizing
that McDonnell Douglas is obviously not the exclusive method of proving violations, the
court did recognize that a prima facie case of age motivation can be established by proving
the McDonnell Douglas elements, and, when proved, the employer will have the burden of
articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 1180.
Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978); see Tribble v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982).
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979); see Lovelace v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d
1109, 1112 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
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performing at the level of the employer's legitimate expectations,
and that after dismissal the employer sought others to perform the
same work.69 An even further refinement was necessary when the
plaintiff was discharged pursuant to a general reduction in force.
In such cases no persons are being hired to replace anyone; thus no
vacancies exist. Consequently, where a forty-to-seventy-year-old
plaintiff is a victim of a force reduction, he need not show that the
defendant sought others to fill the plaintiff's position. The fact
that plaintiffs were laid off will suffice.7 0 Note that a prima facie
case in the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits need not include
proof that persons younger than the plaintiffs were favored over
the plaintiff or that there were favored persons outside the pro-
tected forty-to-seventy age group.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits employ two different standards
that vary with the nature of the employer's action. In all cases ex-
cept layoffs pursuant to a reduction in force, the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits utilize the McDonnell Douglas model but addition-
ally require as part of a prima facie showing that the plaintiff
prove that persons outside the protected age group were favored.71
In refusal-to-hire cases the plaintiff must prove not only that she
was in the protected age group, was qualified for a vacancy, and
was rejected, but also that the employer hired a person who was
under the age of forty.7 2 In discharge cases the plaintiff must prove
that she was performing satisfactorily, was discharged, and that
her job was absorbed directly or indirectly"3 by persons under
49 Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); see Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982).
70 See Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982); Mistretta
v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1981); McCorstin v. United States Steel
Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1980). N
71 See Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 1982); Wil-
liams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
943 (1982).
71 See Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 819 (1981); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977).
73 See McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980). The
court reasoned:
Seldom will a sixty-year-old be replaced by a person in the twenties. Rather the sixty-
year-old will be replaced by a fifty-five-year old, who, in turn, is succeeded by a
[younger person]. Eventually, a person outside the protected class will be elevated
but rarely to the position of the one fired.
[Vol. 17:621
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forty.74 In situations where the plaintiff's job has been eliminated
pursuant to a reduction in force, the McDonnell Douglas approach
is virtually abandoned. In that instance a prima facie case will be
established by proving that: (1) the plaintiff was in the protected
age group and was adversely affected by the employer action; (2)
the plaintiff was qualified to assume another position at the time
of the demotion or discharge; and (3) the plaintiff has circumstan-
tial or direct evidence from which the factfinder might reasonably
conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching
the decision. To satisfy this final element, the evidence must lead
the factfinder reasonably to conclude either a) that the defendant
consciously refused to consider retaining or relocating plaintiff be-
cause of age, or b) that the defendant regarded age as a negative
factor in such consideration.7 5
74 See id. at 752.
75 See Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 US. 943 (1982).
The course the Fifth Circuit followed in adopting this standard was both erratic and
nonanalytical The first case to address the issue of the applicability of McDonnell Douglas
to ADEA cases was Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.
1974). The court applied the McDonnell Douglas model and held that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of age discrimination by proving that he was in the protected
age group, was doing satisfactory work, was terminated without adequate explanation, and
was replaced by a younger person. Id. Significantly, the court did not require that the fa-
vored person be under age 40. Indeed the person who replaced plaintiff Wilson was aged 50.
Id. The Fifth Circuit, in Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123, 1124 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1977), placed Wilson in some doubt by suggesting that McDonnell Douglas might not
be an appropriate model in ADEA cases. The court, however, did not address the elements
necessary for a prima facie case. Later that year the court moved away from the Lindsey
suggestion and reconfirmed Wilson by holding that McDonnell Douglas was an appropriate
framework for analyzing ADEA complaints. Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554
F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1977). The court then concluded that the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case by proving that a person outside the protected age group was hired to
replace him. Significantly, the court did not require proof of favoritism of persons outside
the class; it merely confirmed that a prima facie case had been established and affirmed a
lower court judgment for plaintiff. Id. at 736. The court cited Wilson, apparently with ap-
proval, which had clearly held that such proof was not necessary. Id. at 735. Shortly there-
after, in Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977), the court
adopted the brief comment from Marshall to hold, for the first time, that a plaintiff was not
entitled to a judgment because he failed to establish a prima facie case by proving that he
was replaced by a person under age 40. There was no analysis of the significance of this
requirement. As authority, the court cited Wilson, which had held to the contrary. Id. at 612
n.7. Without analysis or supporting authority, the Price court thus required a new element
for plaintiff's prima facie case. This new requirement was subsequently utilized without sig-
nificant analysis. See Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.
1980); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1978).
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In the reduction-in-force situations the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
A break in the Price approach came with McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980). For the first time the court evaluated the significance of the ele-
ments of a prima facie case in establishing an inference of age motivation. The conclusion
reached was that proof of favoritism toward younger persons was not necessary to create an
inference of age motivation. Id. at 753-54. Language in McCorstin was sufficiently broad to
suggest that the court was readopting the early Wilson v. Sealtest approach. The new ap-
proach seemed to be followed in Carter v. Maloney Trucking & Storage Inc., 631 F.2d 40
(5th Cir. 1980), where the court found that a middle-aged plaintiff who had been denied
employment had established a prima facie case without any stated evidence that a person
under 40 was hired to fill the employer's vacancy. Id. at 42. Another case similarly required
proof that persons under 40 were favored over plaintiff, but this time the court cited both
McCorstin and Price with no apparent recognition of the inconsistency between the two
cases. Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1980). Another case
imposed the requirements of Price while noting with a "but see" the inconsistency of Mc-
Corstin. See Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 819 (1981). The early Wilson case, which was contrary, was long forgotten.
It was in Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 943 (1982), that the court attempted to reconcile the vacillating lines of authority. That
reconciliation adopts the Price approach to hiring, promotion, and individual discharges by
demanding proof that persons outside the protected age group be hired or retained in situa-
tions other than reductions in force. Id. at 128. The court rejected Wilson and the Implica.
tions of McCorstin and ignored the overwhelming authority to the contrary from other cir-
cuits. In attempting to restate McCorstin in the factual context in which it arose--reduction
in force-the court failed to appreciate the basic premises of the McCorstin analysis. Al-
though replacement by younger persons is not required, direct evidence of age motivation Is,
and this is a rejection of both McCorstin and McDonnell Douglas.
The Fifth Circuit has shown no recent inclination to retract or refine its analysis. See
Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 520 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982); Baldwin v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1982).
The story of the Eleventh Circuit is one of "follow the leader." The Eleventh Circuit was
formed from the former Fifth Circuit and adopted as precedent the decisions from the for-
mer Fifth. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en bane). It
was this reason, rather than any independent analysis, that apparently prompted the Elev-
enth Circuit initially to adopt in toto the Fifth Circuit position in Williams. The first case in
the circuit to address the issue of a prima facie showing under the ADEA was Anderson v.
Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1982). The court there stated, in passing,
that a prima facie case of age-motivation discharge required the plaintiff to show that he
was replaced by a younger person outside the protected age group. Id. at 1224. Significantly,
however, the court supported this conclusion not with Williams but with the relatively ob-
scure case of Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 819 (1981), a case that predated Williams and noted the then existing inconsistency in
the Fifth Circuit. See Anderson, 675 F.2d at 1224. More significantly the court repeatedly
cited McCorstin for the general proposition that the requirements for a prima facie showing,
established by prior cases, need not be rigidly followed. Id. at 1223-24. (It is interesting to
note that Judge Kravitch was the author of both MeCorstin and the Eleventh Circuit opin-
ion in Anderson.) Finally, as the facts were presented to the court, the court ruled that the
defendant had articulated a legitimate reason for its discharge of the plaintiff. Given the
ambiguity of this decision, there was no reason for the Eleventh Circuit slavishly to follow
Williams. At this point the stage was set for the Eleventh Circuit to adopt the Wilson and
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cuits have thus turned away from the concept that age motivation
can be inferred from the fact that younger persons are retained in
their jobs while older plaintiffs, who perform similar work, are laid
off. These Circuits did not make clear, however, why an inference
of age motivation is weaker when the older worker is laid off than
when the same worker is discharged or denied employment that is
subsequently offered to a younger applicant. The practical result is
that in many, if not most, layoff situations the plaintiff simply will
be unable to establish a prima facie case because evidence of actual
age animus is rarely available, and unless there is a significant
number of persons laid off any statistical data may be inherently
unreliable." The defendant thus will not be required to articulate
any reason for the treatment of the older plaintiff. Obviously, the
absence of any articulated reason means that the laid-off older
worker will be effectively deprived of any ability to focus the issue
by challenging the existence, legitimacy, or uniform application of
the reason. By forcing older victims of a layoff to present actual
McCorstin line of authority. In Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th
Cir. 1982), however, the court without significant independent reasoning unambiguously em-
braced Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 943 (1982), quoting at length from that opinion.
In Pace v. Southern Ry., 701 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1983), however, the court appeared to
retreat from the position that a prima facie case required proof that a person outside the
protected age group be favored. The court, again through Judge Kravitch, noted that proof
that a person outside the protected age group was favored established a prima fade case but
held that this was not the only method by which a prima fade case could be created. Id. at
1386. The court again cited McCorstin, the opinion from the Fifth Circuit, authored by
Judge Kravitch, for the position that such proof was not necessary in reduction-in-force
situations. Id. at 1387. The court also cited with approval Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641
F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981), which found a prima fade case when
a plaintiff was replaced by a younger person coupled with direct evidence of age-based dis-
tinctions. 701 F.2d at 1388. The court also noted without objection the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach that a prima facie case could be established by proof that plaintiff was replaced by a
person "substantially younger." Id. at 1389-90. The court found, however, that in the case
before it there was no direct or persuasive statistical evidence of age motivation and the
person favored over plaintiff was 49 years old, only two years younger than the plaintiff. Id.
at 1390. This the court held was insufficient to support an inference of age motivation. Pace
thus reopens the possibility that when the court is presented with a factual pattern of a
plaintiff being replaced by a substantially younger person, the court will be willing to aban-
don the Fifth Circuit approach and hold that such a plaintiff can establish a prima fade
case.
76 See Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1982); Harpring v.
Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981);
Harper v. TWA, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d
1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1975).
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evidence of age prejudice as part of a prima facie case, the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits have thrown into disarray the system of
proof carefully constructed by the Supreme Court in the McDon-
nell Douglas line of cases. These Circuits have erected nearly in-
surmountable barriers that force laid-off older workers to estab-
lish that the favoritism shown younger workers was a violation of
the ADEA.
In situations that involve hiring, promotion, and discharge, the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have not abandoned the McDonnell
Douglas model. They have transposed the model in such a way as
to overlook the basic premises underlying McDonnell Douglas. As
stated earlier, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits restate McDonnell
Douglas by holding that a prima facie case must include proof not
only that the person favored in the hiring, discharge, or promotion
was younger than plaintiff, but also that the favored person was
under the age of forty. Thus, although the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits are willing to infer that an employer who selects an applicant
aged thirty-nine over a fifty-year-old is more likely than not moti-
vated by age, these courts are unwilling to allow such an inference
when a forty-one-year-old applicant is selected over one who is
fifty-two. 77 Such a distinction is absurd, since the age difference is
the same. To illustrate further, a qualified but rejected fifty-year-
old applicant for a vacancy will state a prima facie case by showing
that a person thirty-nine years old was selected. Defendant would
then have to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
favoring the thirty-nine-year-old hiree over the fifty-year-old
plaintiff. The age difference is only eleven years. On the other
hand, if a person aged forty-one was awarded the job over a quali-
fied sixty-eight-year-old applicant, no prima facie case would have
been established, notwithstanding the twenty-seven-year age dif-
ference. The defendant in such a case would have no burden to
articulate any reason for preferring the applicant who is twenty-
seven years junior to the plaintiff. Absent direct evidence of age
prejudice, the sixty-eight-year-old plaintiff would never reach the
jury and would therefore lose as a matter of law. This result is
hard to justify.
The requirement that the plaintiff prove that one under forty
was selected probably was inspired by the notion, found in some
" See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Title VII cases, that if a black applicant is employed to fill the
vacancy a black plaintiff will not establish a prima facie case of
race discrimination.78 Such a conclusion is defensible because if a
black applicant is immediately employed to the vacancy it may be
difficult to infer any racial motivation in the rejection of plaintiff.
The logic in ADEA cases, however, in no way suggests that a prima
facie showing should require proof that the favored person is under
forty. The inference of race discrimination is created by different
treatment accorded individuals of different races. Likewise, in age
cases the age difference between the person selected and the plain-
tiff creates the inference that age was a motivating factor.
The error of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits is attributable to
their failure to recognize the fact that this inference of age motiva-
tion has nothing to do with whether the person favored by the em-
ployer would be entitled to complain if this favored person were
the victim of age discrimination. The fact that whites are protected
by Title VII against race discrimination," and males against sex
discrimination, 0 has never been relevant to the issue of whether a
woman or a black has stated a prima facie case of illegally moti-
vated action. Similarly, the fact that the favored person is over
forty and thus could claim the protection of the ADEA is not rele-
vant to the issue of motivation. Again, the inference of age motiva-
tion is a product of different treatment accorded to different age
groups and not whether the favored person, if injured, could sue
under the statute.
The end result of the approach of the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits is virtually to insulate the favorable treatment of employees
or applicants over age forty from serious challenge. Regardless of
the age differential between the plaintiff and the favored person
over forty, the employer will be under no duty to articulate reasons
Is See Freeman v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 398, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Jones v. Western Geo-
physical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1982); De Vold v. Bailar, 568 F.2d 1162,
1164-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (race); Jones v. Public Defender Sev., 553 F. Supp. 1031, 1041-42
(D.D.C. 1983) (race); Carter v. Dialysis Clinic, 30 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1734 (NJD.
Ga. 1981); Brazer v. St. Regis Paper Co., 498 F. Supp. 1092, 1097-98 (M.D. Fi. 1980) (race);
cf. Keys v. Lutheran Family & Children's Serva., 668 F.2d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1981) (in
Title VII action black female established prima facie case notwithstanding that she was
replaced by a black female).
7' McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Tramp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
o Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US. 950
(1971).
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for its favorable treatment of the younger employee. This, it seems,
is a corruption of both the letter and the spirit of the McDonnell
Douglas model.
The Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the requirement of
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that plaintiff must show that per-
sons outside the age group of forty-to-seventy were favored over
plaintiff.81 At the same time the court did not adopt the simple
formula that merely required a showing that a qualified plaintiff
was rejected and that the defendant sought to fill the vacancy.82
Rather, the Ninth Circuit requires that the plaintiff prove that she
is within the protected age group, that plaintiff was qualified, but
did not receive the job, or was discharged, and that persons "sub-
stantially younger" than the plaintiff were employed or retained.83
Also, the Ninth Circuit, unlike other courts, apparently has not
made any fundamental distinction between cases involving hiring,
firing, or reduction in force.8 4 The Third, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuits appear to have adopted a standard for a prima
facie case, similar to that of the Ninth, that requires some showing
that persons younger than the plaintiff were favored, but does not,
however, require that the younger person be under age forty.80
The requirement of showing that a younger person was favored
over the plaintiff may expand on the literal requirement of Mc-
Donnell Douglas. Nevertheless, as stated above, some Title VII
case law has indicated that a plaintiff's prima facie case of race or
8, Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1981).
82 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). At what
point the favored person becomes "substantially younger" will be difficult to define. In
Douglas, the plaintiff was age 54 and was replaced by a person age 49. The five-year age
difference was deemed "substantial" enough to create a prima facie case. Id. at 533.
" See Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 1981). In Naton, the plaintiff
was discharged as part of a reduction-in-force plan. The court did not detail specific ele-
ments that the plaintiff would have to prove to establish an ADEA violation in such a situa-
tion. The court, instead, reviewed the relevant evidence, which indicated that the defendant
was seeking younger employees, and concluded that the plaintiff's age was a determining
factor in his discharge. Id. at 698.
85 See Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d
892, 895 (3d Cir. 1980); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979); cl. Mis-
tretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1981) (court suggested in a layoff
situation that if a trial court had ruled against plaintiffs solely on the basis of plaintiffs'
inability to prove that they had been replaced by younger persons, this would have been a
sound basis for appeal).
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sex discrimination will be defeated by a showing that a person of
the same race and sex as the plaintiff was employed in the position
sought by the plaintiff."s This is because if a person of the same
race and sex as the plaintiff were employed in the position sought
or occupied by the plaintiff it would be difficult, absent additional
facts, to infer that the treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by
race or sex considerations.87 The same logic would appear to be
valid under the ADEA. If the evidence shows that persons of ap-
proximately the same age as the plaintiff were employed over her
then it is difficult to draw an inference that the defendant was mo-
tivated by age considerations. 8
When there is a substantial age difference between the plaintiff
and the person favored, however, regardless of whether the favored
person is below or above age forty, it is possible for a court to infer
that the employer was motivated by the age difference between the
competitors. The greater the age difference is, the greater the in-
ference of age motivation will be.
The Ninth Circuit's approach to a prima facie case 9 is thus the
approach ultimately most loyal to the principles of McDonnell
Douglas. The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the age difference be-
tween the plaintiff and persons favored by the employer is the sig-
nificant factor in the creation of the inference of discriminatory
motive, and not simply the adverse treatment of the plaintiff.20
The major divisions among the circuits may be summarized as
See cases cited supra note 78.
See Keys v. Lutheran Family & Childres Serva, 668 F.2d 356, 359-60 (8th Cir. 1981)
(Gibson, J., dissenting). Of course, if it appears that hiring persons of the same classification
as the plaintiff was being used to avoid litigation, then illegal discrimination would be estab-
lished notwithstanding the lack of an initial inference of nondiscriminatory conduct. See
Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. World
Book-Childcraft Int'l, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
See Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 242 n.13 (4th Cir. 1982). Thus, the
position of the Ninth Circuit appears to be soundly based. It is of no great import, however,
in most cases whether this evidence of younger persons is a required part of the prima facie
case, or whether such evidence can be used by defendant to defeat the prima fade case.
Although the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits do not require a showing by the plaintiff
that younger persons were favored, there is nothing in these cases to indicate that, if evi-
dence were presented by the defendant showing that the persons hired over plaintiff were
approximately the same age as plaintiff, this would not undercut the prima facie showing of
plaintiff. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit suggested this in Louelace. Id.
n See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
1o See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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follows: (1) First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits: relatively literal ad-
aptation of McDonnell Douglas with no proof of favoritism toward
younger persons required; (2) Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits: requirement that plaintiff prove as part
of her prima facie case that persons "substantially younger" than
the plaintiff were favored; (3) Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: in all
cases, except reduction-in-force, the plaintiff must prove that per-
sons under age forty were favored over the plaintiff, and in reduc-
tion-in-force situations there must be additional evidence beyond
bare McDonnell Douglas elements that suggests age motive.91 The
approaches of the Second and Seventh Circuits are unclear.9 2
2. The Standard Applied: The Elements of a Plaintiff's Prima
Facie Case: What Must Be Proved and How.
a. Age. First, all courts agree that the plaintiff must establish
that her age at the time of the employment decision was between
forty and seventy. The plaintiff should secure an admission during
discovery or stipulation prior to trial. If that is not secured, the
91 The Sixth Circuit, while now accepting the McDonnell Douglas model, has not pre-
cisely defined the necessary elements of a prima facie case. The court appeared to require
proof that a younger person was favored by the employer, but left open the question
whether the younger person must also be under age 40. See Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp.,
696 F.2d 1176, 1181 n.6 (6th Cir. 1983).
92 In the Second Circuit one case indicated a need for a plaintiff to prove that younger
persons were favored without suggesting a need to prove that persons under 40 were fa-
vored. See Stanojev v. Ebasco Servo., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 919-20 (2d Cir. 1981); cf. EEOC v.
TWA, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1187, 1218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that inference of discrimina-
tion can be drawn when the replacement is younger but not outside the protected class). In
Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1983), the court stated: "[A] prima
facie case of age discrimination would consist of sufficient evidence to support a finding that
(i) she was in the protected age group, (ii) she was qualified for her job, (iii) she was dis-
charged, and (iv) the discharge occurred in circumstances which give rise to an inference of
age discrimination." The court gave no indication as to what "circumstances" would give
rise to an inference of age motivation. Presumably, replacement by a substantially younger
person would be such a "circumstance." The Second Circuit thus requires something more
to be proved than adverse treatment of an older worker, but how much more is unclear. The
Seventh Circuit, in an ambiguous opinion, suggested that the plaintiff's McDonnell Douglas
burden included proof that the employer had no legitimate reason for its action. See
Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1219, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); see also Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 688 F.2d 647,
549 (7th Cir. 1982); Michaelis v. Polk Bros. Prods., 545 F. Supp. 109, 111 (N.D. I1, 1982).
This, of course, misstates the McDonnell Douglas obligation and places the obligation to
establish a negative element on the plaintiff-a fact completely within the knowledge of the
defendant.
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plaintiff should introduce an official document such as a birth cer-
tificate or passport. Courts have not generally required, as part of a
prima facie case, proof that the defendant was aware of the plain-
tiff's age at the time the defendant acted. Nonetheless a wise
plaintiff would present evidence of the defendant's knowledge.
This knowledge should be proved because it is the defendant's
awareness that the plaintiff was over age forty that permits an in-
ference that the age of the plaintiff motivated the defendant's de-
cision. 3 This fact, too, can be satisfied by an admission or stipula-
tion. If it is not so satisfied, the plaintiff should present documents
such as application forms or insurance policies that would permit a
finder of fact to infer that defendant was aware of plaintiff's gen-
eral age. Oral statements, such as "the plaintiff is over the hill" or
"one of the good ole boys," made before the trial would indicate
that the defendant's agents knew or believed that the plaintiff was
over forty. 4 The plaintiff clearly should not rely on details of the
personal appearance of the plaintiff, such as gray hair, to establish
the defendant's knowledge. 5
b. Employer's action: rejection or discharge. The second uni-
versally required element is that the plaintiff either sought a job 0
and was rejected or that as an employee she was discharged or sub-
jected to an adverse employment action. Although this element is
not difficult to prove, if not stipulated, the plaintiff should intro-
duce evidence of such adverse action. This could be done through
Hodgson v. Earnest Mach. Prods., Inc., 479 F.2d 1133, 1134 (6th Cir. 1973). In Parcin-
ski v. Outlet Co., 673 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1982), plaintiff failed to prove age motivation
when it was shown that the decision that affected the plaintiff was made without knowledge
of the ages of the affected persons.
See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975), where a notation on a
file stating that plaintiff had "too many years on the job" was sufficient to raise an inference
of age motivation. See also Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 823 (5th
Cir. 1972) (notation "too old for teller" aided in establishing prima facie case).
" Hodgson v. Earnest Mach. Prods., Inc., 479 F.2d 1133, 1134 (6th Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Reilly v. Friedman's Express, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 618, 624 (M.D. Pa. 1983)
(informal inquiry not an application); Johnson v. Armco, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (D.
Md. 1982); Nelms v. Ampex Corp., Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 9466 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
See Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (employee resigned
and was not terminated). An employee can be "constructively discharged," however, when
an employer "deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the
employee is forced into an involuntary resignation." Id.; see Young v. Southwestern Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (working conditions must be "so difficult or
unreasonable that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would be forced to quit").
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testimony of the plaintiff. Any supporting documentary evidence
available, however, such as an application form, letter of rejection,
or a discharge slip, should be introduced.
c. Vacancy. In cases involving applications for initial employ-
ment, promotion, or transfer, the plaintiff must prove the existence
of a vacancy. Occasionally, proof of this element can present
problems."' If the defendant does not admit that a vacancy existed,
documents should be introduced that show the defendant adver-
tised in the media for positions, that the defendant had contacted
a union or employment agency, that the job opening was posted or
appeared in a staffing or organizational chart. If nothing else is
available, the plaintiff can testify that she was told of a vacancy or
at the time of the application was not told by the defendant that
no vacancy existed, or both. Proof of vacancy is not necessary in a
discharge case.
d. Qualification. The fourth element that the plaintiff must
prove is that she was "qualified" for the job. This element, more
than any other, has proved difficult to define. In discharge cases
defendants have argued that plaintiffs must prove they are "quali-
fied" for continued employment by showing that they did not war-
rant discharge.9 9 Similarly, in situations involving reduction in
force, defendants have argued that plaintiffs must show that they
were "qualified" for continued employment by proving that they
were superior to employees not laid off. Generally, in both Title
VII and ADEA litigation, such arguments have been rejected. Ac-
cording to the weight of authority, proof that up to the point of
discharge the plaintiff was doing satisfactory work establishes that
the plaintiff was "qualified." 100 That there was "good cause" for
93 See, e.g., Daves v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1981); Cha-
vez v. Tempe Union High School Dist. No. 213, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff
in Chavez argued that she was denied advancement to chairperson owing to her national
origin. The court, however, found that at the time the plaintiff applied for the position, it
had already been filled. The court noted that the plaintiff had ample notice of the opening
but failed to take advantage of the opportunity. Id. at 1090, 1093; see also Lee v. National
Can Corp., 699 F.2d 932, 937-38 (7th Cir. 1983).
" See, e.g., Grant v. Gannett Co., 538 F. Supp. 686, 689 (D. Del. 1982).
100 Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); Lovelace v. Sherwin.
Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir. 1982); Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088,
1094 (5th Cir. 1981); Grant v. Gannett Co., 538 F. Supp. 686, 689-90 (D. Del. 1982); cf.
Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1977) (Title VII). But see
the leading case of Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979), where the
court stated: "Complainant would be required to show that he was 'qualified' in the sense
[Vol. 17:621
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the discharge is a burden to be carried by the defendant after a
prima facie case is made and not telescoped into the plaintiff's
prima facie showing. "Qualification" can be established by intro-
ducing prior efficiency ratings, bonus awards, or salary increases.
Even the length of employment and the lack of reprimands should
establish the "qualification" of the current employee for continued
employment.
In cases involving a refusal to hire or promote to a vacancy, de-
fendants have argued that an applicant is "qualified" only if she
was relatively the most qualified. Courts have not required this
level of proof. Generally stated, at least in Title VII litigation, the
plaintiff need prove only that she possesses the posted job qualifi-
cations.10 1 That is, if the job requires typing fifty words per min-
ute, the plaintiff must prove that she can so perform. If the va-
cancy is for a "skilled mechanic," the plaintiff must show that
through training and experience she has that skill. If the job speci-
fications state a college degree and five years' experience, the
plaintiff must introduce into evidence proof that she possesses
those credentials. Comparative evidence showing that the plaintiff
is the best, or most qualified, of the applicants is not part of a
prima facie case. Rather, evidence that the person hired had abili-
ties, skills, or traits superior to the plaintiff is a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" to be presented by defendants.0 2
The Seventh Circuit, however, appears to have departed from
this interpretation of "qualified." One case involved an employee
over age forty who worked for the defendant for two years and re-
ceived performance evaluations of "good."'0 3 He was discharged.
that he was doing his job well enough to rule out the possibility that he was fired for inade-
quate job performance, absolute or relative." Id.
101 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981); Furaco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d
633, 671-72 (4th Cir. 1983); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir.
1983); cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)
(suggesting that the plaintiff's prima facie case include proof of "an absolute or relative lack
of qualifications" (emphasis added)). The suggestion has prompted a minority of courts to
hold that when the defendant has indicated that the plaintiff was not selected because of
superior qualifications of another applicant, the plaintiff must prove, as part of her prima
facie showing, that a less qualified person was selected. See Cartagena v. Secretary of Navy,
618 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir. 1980); Fridge v. Staats, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 216
(D.D.C. 1982).
102 See supra note 101.
,o3 Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1218-19 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
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Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiff had not carried the bur-
den of proving that he was "qualified" because the evidence indi-
cated that in some aspects the plaintiff's work had been inferior to
other employees.10' Although the court's result may be defensible
in that work deficiencies ultimately justified the employer's action,
the decision suggests a burden on the plaintiff to prove a nega-
tive-absence of faults-as part of a prima facie showing, a burden
the weight of authority would not place on the plaintiff.
e. Favoring younger persons. The Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
and District of Columbia Circuits have indicated that plaintiffs
must prove, as a part of their prima facie case, that substantially
younger persons were favored over the plaintiff. Even in circuits
not specifically requiring it, however, such evidence of relative age
should always be presented by the plaintiff. Ultimately, it is the
difference in age between the plaintiff and the persons favored by
the employer that permits an inference of age discrimination to be
drawn.105 If the differences are dramatic, the probative value is
great. In cases involving a refusal to employ or a denial of a promo-
tion, evidence of age differential should not be difficult to present.
Through discovery the plaintiff can secure from the defendant the
name and age of those hired for the vacancy sought by the plain-
tiff. In cases involving discharges, however, it may be difficult to
identify the particular person replacing the plaintiff. Nonetheless,
evidence that the discharge of the plaintiff started a chain of
events that ultimately created a vacancy filled by a younger em-
ployee will suffice,106 as will evidence that the work of the plaintiff
was shared or absorbed by a number of younger workers.01
When the plaintiff is laid off pursuant to a reorganization or re-
duction in force, it perhaps is impossible to show that younger em-
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
101 Id. at 1220-21; see also Erwin v. Bank of Miss., 512 F. Supp. 545, 551 (N.D. Miss.
1981). In Erwin the court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove qualification when evi-
dence presented by the employer indicated that the plaintiff had a "bad attitude" and lack.
ed ability to "secure cooperation" of co-workers. Id.
105 See Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 242 n.13 (4th Cir. 1982); Douglas
v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013
n.9 (1st Cir. 1979).
108 See McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980).
'07 See Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff demonstrated
statistically that workers over 40 were disproportionately affected by the employer's reduc-
tion-in-force plan).
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ployees actually displaced the plaintiff. Proof of a statistically sig-
nificant pattern showing that a disproportionate number of older
workers were adversely affected, however, should satisfy any re-
quirement that the plaintiff show that younger employees were fa-
vored over the plaintiff.108 Plaintiffs thus should be alert to devel-
oping a statistical showing. Raw data can be discovered in the
defendant's employment records. Should expert analysis of this
data indicate a pattern of age distinctions that is unlikely to be
produced by chance or nonage factors, this evidence should be
presented. This can be done through qualification of the expert,
identification and introduction of the raw employment records,
summaries prepared by the expert from that data, and the expert's
testimonial conclusions regarding the statistical significance of the
data. This evidence may be necessary to establish a prima facie
showing in those courts requiring some showing of favoritism to-
ward younger workers and is circumstantial evidence of motivation
for those courts requiring more than a bare McDonnell Douglas
showing.110
In the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits plaintiffs should be sure to
show hiring of or replacement by a person under age forty. A viola-
tion exists, of course, regardless of the age of the favored person.
Absent alternative evidence, however, a prima facie inference of
age motivation in these courts requires proof that a person under
103 See Schmid v. Frosch, 680 F.2d 248, 250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia Corp.,
639 F.2d 600, 621 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating that statistics provide a strong circumstantial
basis for determining the presence of age discrimination); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605
F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1979) (statistics demonstrated that odds were 97 to 3 that age had
something to do with the plaintiffs discharge).
109 See Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Ser., 699 F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1983);
Schmid v. Frosch, 680 F.2d 248, 249-51 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982); Davis v. Califano, 613
F.2d 957, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See generally D. B Jmus & J. CoLE, STATS=CAL PnooF oF
DISCRIMINATION § 1-2 (1980); C. SULuLVAN, M. ZvamR & . RICHmAS, supra note 6, § 1.8.
Absent some indication of the disparate treatment of the plaintiff, however, the statistical
data, standing alone, may not show disparate treatment. Compare Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
650 F.2d 64, 69-70 (5th Cir. 1981) (statistical evidence that showed the existence of age
discrimination in hiring policies is irrelevant to proving discriminatory discharge as to a
particular employee), with Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30, 694 F.2d
531, 552 (9th Cir. 1982) (statistical evidence showing a clear pattern of discrimination inex-
plicable on grounds other than race can establish prima facie case). The statistical evidence
must involve a sufficiently large experience to be significant. See Stendebach v. CPC Int'l,
Inc., 691 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1982); Pirone v. Home Ins. Co., 31 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1
33,447 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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forty was hired over the plaintiff.
B. Step Two: Defendants' Burden to Articulate Legitimate
Reasons
1. Generally. The Title VII case of Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine established that from a prima facie
showing an inference of illegal motive must be drawn, and if the
defendant fails to come forward with legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its action, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.110 ADEA cases have reached an identical resolution.
Subject only to credibility findings on the existence of the facts
necessary for a prima facie showing, the absence of a legally suffi-
cient demonstration by the defendant to meet a prima facie case
requires the court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff.111
Burdine held also that the "burden to articulate" required the
defendant to do more than plead or argue a reason, but also de-
manded an evidentiary showing that would justify a verdict in the
defendant's favor.11 2 Such a requirement is equally applicable to
the ADEA. 113
The Title VII case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green held
that, to be legally sufficient, the reason articulated must be "legiti-
mate" and "nondiscriminatory. 11 4 The ADEA, however, has lan-
guage not found in Title VII that allows discharge "for good
cause" 115 and permits an employer to make distinctions based on
"reasonable factors other than age. 11 6 Some ADEA cases have
adopted the precise language used in McDonnell Douglas, "legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason,"1 17 while other courts have uti-
lized the statutory language of the ADEA and placed a burden on
"10 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
211 See, e.g., Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir. 1982); Tribblo
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656
F.2d 528, 535 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (10th
Cir. 1981).
RU 450 U.S. at 255.
'18 See Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982).
114 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
116 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1976).
116 Id. § 623(f)(1).
117 See, e.g., Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982);
Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 895
(3d Cir. 1980); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1980).
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the employer to present evidence "that the discharge was 'for good
cause,' . . . or . . .was 'based on reasonable factors other than
age.' """ Although the phrases "reasonable factors" and "legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons" could be given different mean-
ings, the courts have not found any particular significance in the
language difference. They seem to accept that "reasonable factors
other than age" and "legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons" are
rough equivalents" 9 and that the defendant's burden is one of
presentation, as opposed to persuasion. 20
118 Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1978); see Price v. Ma-
ryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1977).
129 See Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1981); Marson v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 523 F. Supp. 503, 507 (E.D. Wis 1981).
120 See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1982); Lovelace v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528,
533 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979).
It might be argued that the wording and history of the ADEA suggests a result that would
differ from the Title VII model After all, Title VII, unlike the ADEA, has no "reasonable
factors" defense. The provision in the ADEA is structurally a defense. This "defense" was
inspired by similar language found in the Equal Pay Act that allows employers to justify
pay distinctions between men and women doing "equal work" if the difference is based on
"any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). The "any other factor other
than sex" provision of the Equal Pay Act has been definitively interpreted as an affirmative
defense. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974). Consequently, once
a plaintiff establishes a pay distinction between males and females for jobs that require
"equal work," the employer must carry the burden of persuading the factfinder that the
established pay difference was, in fact, based on a "factor other than sex." Id. at 196-97.
This is not merely a burden of presenting some evidence on the issue, but is a relatively
heavy burden of persuading the factfinder of the business reasonableness and gender neu-
trality of the factor that the defendant alleged to have utilized. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1047
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). This difference between the ADEA and Title
VII and the similarity of the ADEA to the Equal Pay Act could suggest that on the issue of
the nature of defendant's burden the ADEA should follow the Equal Pay Act model and
treat the defendant's burden as a defense that must be proved by defendant. Notwithstand-
ing the superficial appeal of such a suggestion, the courts have been correct in not following
it. Under the Equal Pay Act the issue is one of equal work and unequal pay between
sexes-objective factors. Motive is not part of plaintiff's prima facie case and need not be
proved. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). Under the ADEA,
however, similar to under Title VII, the primary issue is the defendant's motivation. The
plaintiff's burden in an ADEA case, unlike the Equal Pay Act, is to create an inference of
improperly motivated action. The role of the defendant's burden under the ADEA, as under
Title VII, is simply to place in issue the inference of motivation drawn from plaintiffs prima
facie case. This is fundamentally a different issue from that confronted in the Equal Pay
Act, where only equality of work and inequality of pay, not motive, are addressed. Given the
difference in issues between an ADEA case and the Equal Pay Act, it is appropriate to
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Under Title VII the concept of "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" is fixed and constant in that the reason articulated is not
balanced against the strength of the prima facie case to determine
by the relative weight whether the reason is "legitimate. ' 121 This is
because in Title VII litigation the McDonnell Douglas formula
produces an inference of motivation that remains essentially con-
stant. For example, hiring a white over a black applicant produces
an inference of racial motivation that does not vary appreciably
from case to case. The relationship that produces the inference of
race motivation remains constant. Additional evidence may
strengthen the inference, but that evidence goes to pretext and is
not part of the prima facie showing. Similarly, if a woman is dis-
charged and replaced by a man, the initial inference of sex motiva-
tion does not change significantly by altering the factual context.
In each case the relationship between the plaintiff and the favored
person is a fixed or constant relationship that creates an inference
of consistently similar strength. Thus the defendant's burden to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is not balanced,
but rather remains constant.
In age discrimination cases the establishment of the inference of
motivation changes. The relationship between the plaintiff and the
person favored creates an inference of age motivation that will
vary in each case with the difference in the ages of the plaintiff and
the person favored. If the age of the person favored is thirty-nine
and the plaintiff is only forty, very little, if any, inference of age
motivation is created. Indeed, it would be insufficient to establish a
prima facie case. If the age difference is increased to ten years,
however, then the difference in ages between plaintiff and the per-
son favored is sufficient to create an inference of age discrimina-
tion.122 If that age differential is increased to twenty, thirty, or
forty years, the inference of age motivation becomes correspond-
ingly stronger. In short, unlike race or sex differences, which re-
follow the analogous model of Title VII in ADEA litigation.
12, Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978). This is to be contrasted
with the concept of "business necessity" utilized in adverse impact cases. Some courts have
indicated that "necessity" requires a balancing of the need for the criteria against the de-
gree of impact that the criteria imposes on the particular class. See Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
12' Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 242 n.13 (4th Cir. 1982); Douglas v.
Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (4th Cir. 1981).
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main constant, the strength of the inference of age motivation that
flows from a prima facie showing varies and is a product of the
difference between the age of the plaintiff and the age of the per-
son favored by the defendant. It is hard to deny that when the
plaintiff is sixty-five and the favored person is twenty-five-a
forty-year difference-the inference of age motivation is signifi-
cantly stronger than when the plaintiff is forty-five and the favored
person is thirty-five-a ten-year difference.
Because the inference o'f age motivation does vary with the age
differences of the persons involved, it would seem appropriate to
vary the burden of the defendant by making that burden corre-
spond to the strength of plaintiff's prima facie showing. To carry a
burden of going forward with the evidence, a defendant must first
present evidence that would create some inference going to the is-
sue. Second, that inference must be sufficiently strong, in light of
the prima facie showing, to raise a genuine issue of fact that could
be resolved in favor of the defendant. 123 The failure to meet and
refute the prima facie showing would entitle the plaintiff to a
judgment.
This discussion suggests the possibility--one that no court has
yet recognized-that in evaluating the legal sufficiency of the rea-
son articulated by a defendant, the courts in ADEA cases might
utilize a flexible concept of legitimacy. A court could balance the
strength of the reasons articulated in terms of their business ra-
tionality against the relative strength of the prima facie showing.
The greater the age differential between the plaintiff and the per-
son favored, the stronger, in terms of the reason's relationship to
bona fide employer concerns, the defendant's articulated reason
should be. A relatively slight difference in ages would produce an
inference of age discrimination that is relatively weak. In such a
case a reason that is weak in that it is somewhat arbitrary or sub-
jective might be legally sufficient. The same arbitrary or subjective
reason might be held to lack legitimacy where a great difference in
age between the plaintiff and the person favored produced a strong
inference of age motivation. The weakness of the reason in light of
the likelihood that age was a motivating factor would allow a court,
as a matter of law, to conclude that a judgment for the defendant
I Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981); B. ScHL
& P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 401-02 (1976).
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could not be justified.
2. The Elements of Legitimacy: What the Defendant Must
Prove. Regardless of the precise wording of defendants' burden,
ADEA litigation has followed broadly the Title VII concept of "le-
gitimacy" established by McDonnell Douglas and Furnco. Em-
ployer decisions will be deemed legitimate even if not proved to be
"necessary" in terms of being directly tied to work performance. 124
Reasons will not lack legitimacy simply because they may reduce
the employment opportunities of older persons or because the
"reason" articulated is not the "best" method of making employ-
ment decisions.125 The use of the term "legitimate" in both Title
VII and ADEA litigation, however, suggests that an employer
could not rely on reasons that violate the law. Articulation of an
illegal reason is not "legitimate," and such a reason would not sup-
port an inference that the employer was motivated by nonage con-
siderations.12 Furthermore, a reason that is wholly arbitrary and
totally unrelated to any bona fide employer concerns would not be
legally sufficient. Not only are arbitrary reasons, by definition, not
"reasonable" within the express ADEA statutory requirement, a
reason totally unrelated to normal employer concerns would carry
little or no inference that this reason, rather than age, was the rea-
son that motivated the particular decision. 27
"I See Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982); Carter v.
Maloney Trucking & Storage, Inc., 631 F.2d 40, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1980); Marson v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 523 F. Supp. 503, 507-08 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Walter v. KFGO Radio,
518 F. Supp. 1309, 1313-14 (D.N.D. 1981).
'21 See Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 1982); Mis.
tretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1981); Carter v. Maloney Trucking
& Storage, Inc.,0631 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1980). If a particular practice can be shown to have
an adverse impact on older workers, the plaintiff should consider a count based on that
impact. See supra note 18. Plaintiff should not rely on the presence of impact to carry a
disparate treatment charge. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-78
(1978).
,26 For instance, an employer might assert that an employee was discharged because of
union activity, a violation of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 8, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), or not hired because of his race, or her sex, a violation of Title
VII. Such reasons could hardly be said to be either "legitimate" or "nondiscriminatory."
127 A reason that the employee was not hired because he was curly headed or left handed
or blue eyed would lack legal sufficiency because no inference could be drawn that an em-
ployer, who is presumed rational, would be motivated by such irrational factors. See Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). A number of Title VII cases suggested
that "legitimacy" requires some rationality. See Miller v. WFLI Radio, Inc., 687 F.2d 136,
138-39 (6th Cir. 1982); Little v. Master-Bilt Prods., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 901, 903 (N.D. Miss.
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A divergence exists between Title VII and ADEA cases concern-
ing the legitimacy of subjective evaluations and the acceptability of
vague conclusions as legitimate reasons. As a general proposition,
when job performance is capable of objective evaluation, Title VII
courts have tended to reject vague, purely subjective conclusions
concerning employee or applicant ability.128 Subjectivity is suspect
because it lacks norms that allow rebuttal by the plaintiff, and,
consequently, effective judicial review is impossible. Furthermore,
subjectivity is a "ready mechanism for discrimination ... much of
which can be covertly concealed."1 29 Subjective reasons are not,
however, illegitimate per se. If the job or job performance can be
evaluated only in terms of subjective standards, such as those in-
volving management, professional, or artistic skill, Title VII per-
mits the use of reasonable subjective standards, particularly if they
are applied with procedural safeguards to ensure fairness.130
Similarly, under the ADEA, when job duties can be evaluated
only in subjective terms, subjective evaluations of performance can
be legitimate. Even where some subjectivity is unavoidable, how-
ever, some courts may accept a level of subjectivity in ADEA cases
that would be rejected in Title VII litigation. 31
1981).
1s See, e.g., Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983); Gay v. Waiters'
& Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30, 694 F.2d 531, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1982); Watson v. Na-
tional Linen Serv., 686 F.2d 877, 880-81 (11th Cir. 1982); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Sep-
arate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1981); Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226,
1231 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 372 (8th Cir. 1973).
Although Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), raised no ob-
jection to the relatively subjective reason given by defendant ("personality conflicts"), the
Court did require that defendant's reasons be "clear and reasonably specific." Id. at 258. In
Grano v. Department of Dev., 699 F.2d 836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983), the court stated that subjec-
tivity was suspect and the greater the subjectivity is, the greater the defendant's burden
under Burdine to establish its legitimacy will be. Accord Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
697 F.2d 810, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1983).
'" See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972); see also O'Brien
v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1982).
23 See Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65-67 (2d Cir. 1980) (professors); Rogers v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.) (supervisors), vacated, 423 U.S. 809
(1975); Nath v. General Elec. Co., 438 F. Supp. 213, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (engineer), afld,
594 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1979).
231 Compare Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (D.N.D. 1981) (court ac-
cepted relatively subjective justifications for discharging a radio personality over age 40),
with Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d 477, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defendant's
reason for not hiring a white radio announcer-that the announcer did not have a "black
voice," which was presumably preferred by the predominantly black listening audience).
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Even more significant, however, is the difference in which the
courts approach the legitimacy of subjective reasons where per-
formance standards are capable of objective evaluation. In these
cases ADEA decisions appear to accept subjective evaluations and
conclusions that probably would not pass muster in Title VII liti-
gation. For example, courts have allowed testimony about
"strained relationships" and "personality conflicts" to carry the
defendant's burden of presenting reasonable factors. 132 One court
accepted the statement of the defendant that the younger job ap-
plicant who received the appointment was "more articulate and
could present himself in his position more clearly" than could the
plaintiff.13 3 In cases involving layoff of older workers during an eco-
nomic slowdown, courts have accepted testimony of a supervisor
that he had evaluated the relative job performance of numerous
employees and that the plaintiffs' work failed to "measure up."
13
'
As to how the plaintiffs failed to "measure up" the defendant did
not specify, and the courts did not inquire. One employer utilized a
system for determining layoffs by instructing a supervisor to elimi-
nate "the employee that you felt that you would miss least."13s5 No
criteria were specified. No protections were afforded to guard
against age prejudice. Nonetheless, the court held that the defen-
dant had articulated a legitimate basis for discriminating against
the plaintiff.136 The Tenth Circuit has indicated that reasons, such
as that the plaintiffs "lacked versatility" and that their production
had been declining, would be "legitimate" even without additional
specific detail.13 7
Although substantial leeway has been granted to employers to
utilize vague, subjective reasons, occasionally a court will reject a
reason that is patently tied to the age of the plaintiff. For example,
a rejection of an applicant in the protected age group in favor of a
This comparison is not to suggest necessarily that one of the other positions illustrated by
these cases is correct but is to demonstrate the apparent willingness of courts to accept
subjective reasons in ADEA cases that they might reject if placed in a Title VII context.
131 See Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982); Simmons
v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1980).
133 Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1980).
134 See Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1978).
' s Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982).
136 Id.
,37 Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981).
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younger person on the grounds that the older applicant lacks the
"potential" of the younger applicant would not be legitimate." 8
Similarly, statements that the applicant had been in "one line of
work too long," or "she was not current in knowledge of field" may
be so closely related to the age of the applicant that they will not
be accepted as carrying the defendant's burden; and when these
reasons have been part of an overall evaluation system, decisions
based on that system have been overturned.13 Similarly, the em-
ployer may attempt to justify the treatment of older employees on
the grounds that it was eliminating the employees with the highest
wages in an effort to save the maximum amount of money. As this
"reverse seniority" is almost inherently tied to the age of the em-
ployee, such a reason necessarily is based on age and should lack
legitimacy.14 0
This apparent willingness of the courts in ADEA cases to accept
subjective conclusions about the relative worth of the plaintiff
should be reexamined. This reexamination should start with the
proposition that older workers often are the highest paid employ-
ees. Thus, particularly in reduction-in-force situations the em-
ployer's economic temptation is to effect maximum cost reductions
by laying off the older employees. Yet, it is universally recognized
that an employer cannot base employment decisions on the rela-
tive cost of retaining older workers.14 ' Therefore, the courts must
take special care that an employer is not disguising decisions based
on relative costs with rationalizations framed in conclusory terms
such as "more efficient," or "greater overall contribution." Requir-
ing objectivity is the best, and perhaps only, defense against this
I-" See Pirone v. Home Ins. Co., 507 F. Supp. 1281, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). "Potential"
may mean "number of working years remaining," and that translates directly to "age."
"' Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1387-90 (10th Cir. 1981); accord Kerwood v.
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., 494 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1980). In Kerwood, the court
accepted as legitimate for discharge the reason that plaintiff had the "inability to adjust and
cooperate with a new manager's style and zeal." Id. at 1309.
I See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981). The employer in Geller initiated a policy whereby teachers would be recruited only
below a certain salary level. The plaintiff introduced evidence that indicated that approxi-
mately 93% of the currently employed teachers between 40 and 65 years of age were above
the maximum salary level Although the policy was enacted as a cost-cutting device, the
court held that its result caused it to be discriminatory as a matter of law. Id. at 1030, 1033.
141 Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 US. 945
(1981); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 30 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 933 (D. Ariz. 1982); EEOC
Age Discrimination in Employment Interpretative Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(0 (1982).
1983] 657
HeinOnline  -- 17 Ga. L. Rev. 657 1982-1983
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
danger.
It must be recognized, too, that there is a documented prevailing
assumption that older workers simply do not perform on the same
level of efficiency as younger workers.142 The need to overcome this
assumption prompted the enactment of the ADEA. Consequently,
as with cost considerations, courts cannot allow the preconceived
notion of relative ability to be transformed into a restated rational-
ization that the younger worker was "better" or "more effective"
than the plaintiff.
It should be recognized that younger workers are entering their
profession and thus may exhibit an enthusiasm fired by ambition
that will propel them to dramatic short-term job performances.
Older workers, conversely, may be nearing the end of their careers
and usually will not display the same level of kinetic energy, ideal-
ism, and ambition that characterize the work of their younger
counterparts. The contribution of older workers may be a product
of discretion, experience, and wisdom. This difference in approach
of older and younger workers may give a superficial appearance of
comparative inferiority of the older worker. In reality, however, the
differences in ultimate and actual job performance, when all ele-
ments are considered, may not differ significantly. Therefore, to
permit subjectivity (e.g., "harder worker," "more dedication") is to
sanction an inherently inaccurate evaluation system that produces
an inherently discriminatory result.
In summary, when these three factors are considered-tempta-
tion to reduce costs by displacing older workers, prejudice about
the ability of older workers, and general differences in the ap-
proach to jobs-the conclusion must be that subjective conclusions
are inherently unreliable and a potential disguise for conscious or
unconscious use of statutorily proscribed factors. Therefore, when
objective demonstrations of job performance can be generated,
they should be required. Legitimacy demands that reasons based
on a comparison be supported by objective facts. A subjective com-
parison should not be a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason."
Furthermore, even when comparisons are made by applying ap-
parently objective criteria, courts should evaluate the legitimacy of
"" See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976); EEOC, supra note 9; U.S. Dm'T OF LABOn, supra note 9;
see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057-59 (1983); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State
College, 702 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1983).
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these criteria in terms of whether their use will undercut the reme-
dial purposes of the ADEA. If a particular result is desired by the
employer (e.g., elimination of more costly and perceived less effi-
cient workers) and the employer is permitted without check to de-
fine the terms by which that result can be rationalized, most em-
ployers will have little difficulty in selecting in advance the precise
criteria necessary to justify the preconceived desire. This potential
for selective adoption of criteria to produce the desired result is
particularly acute with ate discrimination because it can be ex-
pected that the enthusiasm and ambition of youth might produce
on carefully preselected criteria at least marginally superior results
when measured against the typical working style of the older em-
ployee. Consequently, courts should subject narrow criteria to care-
ful scrutiny and demand that any alleged superiority demonstrated
by the employer's criteria go to the essence of long-term overall job
performance.' 8
This is not to suggest that an incompetent older worker must be
retained, nor that an employer should be obligated to retain de-
monstrably inferior older employees. It is to suggest, however, that
if an older worker's overall job performance meets or exceeds me-
dian norms of the employer's work force, any short term, narrow,
or spot comparison against a younger employee should be accepted
as legitimate only if the data demonstrates the clear overall superi-
ority of the younger worker. If courts tolerate older workers being
replaced by eager new employees who will often, in the short run,
provide at least an apparent and marginal superiority in some as-
pect of their job, the statutory goal of remedying the problem of
older workers being routinely displaced by younger ones easily
could be frustrated.
Finally, when an employer articulates relative performance as a
reason for its action, to be legitimate that comparison should be a
product of an evaluation system procedurally shielded from both
knowledge of relative employer costs and the ages of the persons
being compared. Given the assumed ultimate underlying economic
need to reduce costs, the relative higher costs of older employees,
and the preconceived idea that older workers tend to be less effi-
cient, the fairness of the evaluation is subject to serious doubt if
supervisory personnel have knowledge of relative costs and ages of
143 See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1983).
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employees while applying performance norms. Only if the compari-
son is made on bona fide factors, free of knowledge of costs or age,
can the court be assured that a legitimate comparison was indeed
made. This is particularly true when the employer is utilizing sub-
jective criteria. If the facts are such that a subjective evaluation is
unavoidable, an absolute requirement for legitimacy must be that
this evaluation be made as free as possible from the corrupting in-
fluence of knowledge concerning costs and relative age. 44
Despite the current willingness of the courts to permit subjective
judgments to satisfy the defendant's legal burden of presentation,
defendants should neither ignore objective, procedurally fair meth-
ods of evaluation nor fail to present evidence of detailed objective
reasons for their actions. First, courts may and should begin to
scrutinize unduly vague and subjective reasons more rigidly for le-
gal sufficiency. Second, and most important, if the plaintiff
presents additional evidence of illegal motivation, the defendant's
vague, subjective articulations may make it difficult for the defen-
dant to avoid an adverse jury verdict. Evidence of only vague and
subjective judgments made in an atmosphere of procedural arbi-
trariness will do little to persuade a jury not to believe the plain-
tiff's evidence. Evidence of precise, objective reasons formulated
through a process guarded by procedural fairness will go a long
way in making it difficult for plaintiffs to prove that it was age,
rather than the articulated reason, that motivated the defendant's
decision.
Traditionally, in Title VII litigation, when the defendant as-
serted a reason that necessarily involved comparative evaluation of
performance or credentials, the courts demanded that as an ele-
ment of legitimacy defendants present comparative evidence dem-
onstrating that the person selected over the plaintiff indeed had
the credentials or performance not possessed by the plaintiff. As
the Fifth Circuit stated, "comparative evidence lies at the heart of
a rebuttal of a prima facie case of employment discrimination.1'l 4
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Texas Department
144 See Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 642 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1981)
(inadequate safeguards); Nath v. General Elec. Co., 438 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd,
594 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1979) (adequate safeguards).
145 East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Vaughn v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 659-60 (8th Cir. 1980) (the proffered evidence of legitimacy
lacked objective criteria and was therefore rejected), vacated, 450 U.S. 972 (1981).
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of Community Affairs v. Burdine raised doubt as to the continuing
vitality of the requirement of comparative evidence. The Court
read the decision of the court of appeals as requiring the defendant
to hire a minority plaintiff unless the defendant could prove by
objective evidence that the person hired or promoted was more
qualified than the plaintiff.14' The Court in its reversal stated only
that the employer may "choose among equally qualified candi-
dates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful crite-
ria. '147 Thus, under Title VII litigation, courts, careful not to re-
quire defendants to carry a burden of proof, could continue to
demand some evidentiary showing of the comparison upon which
the "reason" was allegedly based.""'
Regardless of how Burdine is ultimately interpreted on the issue
of comparative evidence under Title VII, ADEA courts have not
demanded that the defendant produce comparative evidence. The
courts have allowed simple testimony, unsupported by objective
records or data, and general conclusions and summations by super-
visors as to the relative merit of laid-off employees to carry the
defendant's burden.
149
Although naked conclusions bare of any evidence of comparative
credentials or performance of persons favored may be legally suffi-
cient, the defendant should, nonetheless, be prepared to present
comparative evidence directly or on cross-examination. The defen-
dant should be aware that the plaintiff can probably secure
through discovery evidence of the qualifications and performance
of persons favored over the plaintiff, and when presented, this evi-
dence will go a long way to prove actual illegal motivation.
'4 450 U.S. at 258.
147 Id. at 259.
145 See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1983); Peters v.
Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1982); Burrus v. United Tel Co., 683 F.2d 339, 343
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 491 (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes 56-
60.
149 See Allison v. Western Union TeL Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982); Harpring
v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 US. 819
(1981); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61-62 (10th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574
F.2d 958, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1978); cf. Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, 21 Fair Empl
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1478, 1480 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant was required to present compara-
tive data).
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 17 Ga. L. Rev. 661 1982-1983
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:621
C. Step Three: Additional Evidence
1. Generally: Plaintiff's Burden. If, but only if, the defendant
carries the burden of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons, the plaintiff must present (or must have presented during
her initial presentation) additional evidence suggesting illegal mo-
tivation. In the face of the defendant's evidence of legitimate rea-
sons, the bare McDonnell Douglas showing, without additional evi-
dence, is not sufficient to raise a jury issue of illegal age
motivation. 150 Thus, when the defendant meets her evidentiary
burden of establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, an
evidentiary burden is placed on the plaintiff to come forward and
present additional evidence of motivation-evidence that suggests
that the defendant's reason is not credible or that the reason ar-
ticulated was a pretext covering improper age motivation.
2. Specific Examples of "Additional Evidence" That Will
Raise the Ultimate Factual Issue of Motivation. The most easily
identifiable evidence of illegal motivation is direct indications of
the defendant's mental state. This direct evidence could be found
in correspondence, employment records, interview files, or even
corporate directives. Notations or directions such as "too old," "too
long on job," "age," or "look for younger workers" strongly suggest
that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by
age considerations.151 Management officials might have been heard
I" See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1982); Lovelace v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Savage Laborato-
ries, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 1982); Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d
756, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir.
1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860
(1981). In Tribble and Spagnuolo a plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age dis-
crimination, and the defendant had articulated a reason (reorganization of jobs) that both
courts deemed "legitimate." This articulation, the courts held, sufficed to avoid a directed
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. Tribble, 669 F.2d at 1196; Spagnuolo, 641 F.2d at 1112.
This articulation by the defendants, however, did not necessarily entitle them to a directed
verdict. Even in the absence of significant evidence of actual illegal motivation or pretext, a
jury issue was presented. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff need not be set aside, because, as
these courts held, the jury was entitled to accept that the reorganization was a pretext.
Tribble, 669 F.2d at 1196; Spagnuolo, 641 F.2d at 1112. The approach of these two courts
appears to be inconsistent with the McDonnell Douglas model as refined in Burdine, which
requires a judgment for the defendant if the plaintiff has no challenge to the defendant's
articulated, legitimate reason.
15' See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1975) (separation notice
stated "too many years in job"); Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 823
(5th Cir. 1972) (interview notes indicated "too old for teller").
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to state a general prejudice against older workers"1 2 or a preference
for "youth" or "creating a youthful image." ' The employer may
have advertisements published that expressed a preference for
workers of a particular age. Such advertisements are an indepen-
dent act of illegality.'" In addition, they provide strong direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motivation for the rejection of the
plaintiff.155
The plaintiff also may have indirect evidence from which the
factfinder could infer improper motivation in the treatment of the
plaintiff. Statistical evidence, for instance, can often be marshaled
in a way that draws an inference of discriminatory motive.'" For
example, the plaintiff may make a work-force comparison that
demonstrates the statistically significant absence of workers of cer-
tain age groups at certain job levels. The percentage of older work-
ers in a particular job is compared with the percentage of older
workers in the area population qualified to perform that particular
job."'57 Or the plaintiff might be able to demonstrate adverse "ap-
plicant flow" by comparing the percentage of younger applicants or
employees with the number of older applicants or employees that
are affected by certain selection procedures.'" For example, the
plaintiff might demonstrate that in selecting employees 'for va-
"'Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Get rid of the good 'ole
Joes" and "get some younger folks in"); Naton v. Bank of CaL, 649 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir.
1981) (plaintiffs are "over the hill").
1 See Jackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1983) (statement that Shell
could "hire younger people for less money"); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir.
1980). Such evidence, although clearly relevant. may not be conclusive evidence of improper
motivation requiring judgment for the plaintiff. Particularly, such statements as, 'The
agency's future lay with the young executives" may be more of a truism than proof of age
bias.
'" 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1976). For a discussion of the range of permissible age preference
advertisements, see 29 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1982).
15 Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1977); Hodg-
son v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1972) (a notation on
interview notes that the plaintiff was too old to be a teller was part of a "strong" prima fade
case).
1" Inferences of motive can be drawn from statistical patterns. See EEOC v. Federal Re-
serve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 645 (4th Cir. 1983); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen'a Union,
Local 30, 694 F.2d 531, 550 (9th Cir. 1982); Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515,
524-25 (5th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
157 E.g., Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 819 (1981); Schulz v. Hancock Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
158 For example, in Michaelis v. Polk Bros., 545 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. IlL 1982), a "25-
year history of hiring young individuals, invariably under 40" was quite probative.
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cancies fifty persons below age forty applied and an equal number
applied who were above the age of forty. The employer hired
twenty persons, and nineteen of those were below age forty. This
"flow" suggests age was a motivating factor. Although such "flow"
evidence is rarely conclusive proof of illegal motivation in that it
will require a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff,15 9 clearly this
evidence can satisfy the plaintiff's evidentiary burden of coming
forward with additional evidence of illegal motivation.1 0 Plaintiffs
thus should be alert to utilizing expert analysis and testimony on
the statistical significance of any data.
Indirect evidence of improper motivation can also come from
comparative evidence. One kind of comparative evidence is a show-
ing that the plaintiff's relevant abilities or potential were superior
to those of the person selected or retained by the defendant.101 The
plaintiff might show that he had greater seniority, higher work
evaluations, less absenteeism, or fewer errors or reprimands than
did the person retained or promoted over the plaintiff. A plaintiff
who sought employment might show the relative qualifications of
the person selected by comparing that person's years of education,
depth or breadth of experience, or quality of recommendations
from past employers with his own. This comparative evidence is
relevant because if the plaintiff can show that the employer se-
lected a person who, as a worker, was generally inferior to the
plaintiff, then this would suggest that it was something other than
job qualifications-namely age-that motivated the defendant's
action.162 Plaintiffs thus should discover all the relevant details of
the background and employment record of persons favored over
the plaintiff.
A second kind of comparative evidence that the plaintiff could
use in rebuttal would be that of comparing methods of selection.
" See Stendebach v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 691 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1982); Allison v. West-
ern Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982); Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 546 F.2d 1123, 1124 (5th Cir. 1977).
110 See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia
Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 623 (10th Cir. 1980); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 131-32
(4th Cir. 1979).
1 E.g., Michaelis v. Polk Bros., 545 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. InI. 1982).
161 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981); Haw-
kins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1983); Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693
F.2d 477, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1982); Burrus v. United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 491 (1982).
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The plaintiff may be able to prove that the method of selection
that resulted in her rejection has a foreseeable impact on the em-
ployment opportunities of older workers. In addition, the plaintiff
may be able to prove that better, more accurate methods of em-
ployee selection were readily available to the defendant. From the
conjunction of alternative less discriminatory selection devices that
would select good employees more accurately, a factfinder would
be allowed to infer that the employer adopted the particular
method of selection precisely because of its discriminatory effect
on older workers and not for any asserted business reason. 63
Plaintiffs may want to consult industrial experts as to available se-
lection devices and their relative impact on older workers.
Finally, the plaintiff may have evidence that any reason articu-
lated by the defendant was not uniformly applied. Such disparate
application of a rule, which shows that persons younger than the
plaintiff were not similarly subject to it, would be clear and direct
evidence of illegal action. For example, the plaintiff might be able
to show that the defendant had failed similarly to discipline
younger employees for misconduct that allegedly prompted the
discharge of the plaintiff.1" Or the plaintiff may be able to show
that the defendant accepted the absence of credentials in hiring
younger applicants while the plaintiff's application was rejected
for allegedly lacking the required credentials.165 The plaintiff
might introduce testimony from other employees who were simi-
larly situated and compare the reasons given to them by the defen-
dant with the reason 'articulated by the defendant for the plain-
tiff's treatment.166 Such testimony might disclose inconsistency or
other suggestions of pretext. In one case a plaintiff proved that the
defendant had expanded the sales territory for the younger sales
person hired to replace the plaintiff.167 This was persuasive evi-
2 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 n.9 (1978) (plaintiffs argued
that hiring method purposely discriminated against blacks); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (where defendant shows job relatedness of employment tests, the
plaintiff will be allowed to demonstrate the existence of equally effective nondiscriminatory
alternatives).
18 Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1982); Walker v.
Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1979).
Leibovitch v. Administrator, 29 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,874 (D.D.C. 1982).
1 Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 819 (1981).
16' Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983).
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dence that the reason for discharging plaintiff, "poor sales per-
formance," was pretextual. 168 Or the plaintiff might show that in a
reorganization younger employees, but not the plaintiff, were given
an opportunity to relocate. 169 Or the plaintiff might show that in
the past seniority was the usual selection factor utilized, while in
her case seniority was ignored. It is important, however, that the
plaintiff do more than allege disparate treatment. Courts will de-
mand that the plaintiff present evidence of specific examples of
such discriminatory application of selection rules and criteria.170
Logic and the traditional model suggest that this additional evi-
dence be presented at the third step of the trial as a rebuttal to the
defendant's articulation of a legitimate reason. It is true that much
of this evidence suggests that the defendant's articulated reason is
but a pretext to disguise illegally motivated action. Nevertheless,
not presenting this evidence at the first stage of the trial during
plaintiff's initial presentation has certain risks. First, the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits in layoff situations171 demand, for a prima facie
showing, evidence in addition to the traditional McDonnell Doug-
las showing. In these courts the absence of additional evidence in
plaintiff's initial showing will result in a directed verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff will have no opportunity for rebuttal. Sec-
ond, elements necessary to establish a prima facie case may be
lacking or not found to be supported by creditable evidence. Thus,
to remedy any possible or unforeseen defects in the prima facie
case, the plaintiff should present additional evidence during her
initial presentation. 7 2 Finally, if from cross-examination or stipu-
lations the defendant establishes an evidentiary basis for a legiti-
mate reason, the plaintiff's bare prima facie showing will have been
met. Should the defendant thereupon elect to rest, a trial court in
its discretion may refuse to allow the plaintiff to reopen its case to
present additional evidence. A directed verdict for the defendant
16 Id. at 1181.
"' Deutsch v. Carl Zeiss, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
170 See Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980).
17 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
171 For example, in courts that follow the Ninth Circuit's requirement that a prima facie
case include a showing that the plaintiff prove that a person "substantially younger" than
the plaintiff secured the job, there might be a debate whether a favored person, indeed, was
"substantially younger," for example, if that plaintiff was only three years older. In such
case a court might rule that such a difference is not "substantial." Absent additional evi-
dence of improper motivation, a judgment might be rendered for defendant.
[Vol. 17:621666
HeinOnline  -- 17 Ga. L. Rev. 666 1982-1983
AGE DISCRIMINATION
could be the result.17  To avoid these dangers plaintiffs should seri-
ously consider abandoning the classical three-step McDonnell
Douglas model, present all of their evidence, both on the prima
facie elements and on pretext, during the initial presentation, and
reserve for rebuttal only evidence that concerns those elements in
the defendant's case that require direct contradiction.1 7 4
3. Defendant's Additional Evidence. It should be noted that
the defendant may have additional evidence, other than her articu-
lated reasons, that suggests that she was not motivated by illegal
considerations. First is the testimony of the defendant's represent-
atives. For example, although mere denials of illegal motive and
assertions of proper motive will not be legally sufficient to meet the
defendant's burden of articulating a "reason," testimonial denials
are admissible and usually should be presented. Second, actions
consistent with the articulated reason, such as similar treatment of
other persons outside the protected age group, suggest the absence
of age motivation. If the plaintiff's treatment was consistent with
past practice, this fact should be proved. Third, the defendant may
be able to develop statistical data that indicates that older workers
are not being treated differently as a class from younger workers or
applicants. Although such evidence does not conclusively show the
lack of discriminatory treatment of a particular plaintiff, it is rele-
vant evidence of the defendant's lack of illegal motivation.17 5
In short, defendants should not rely solely upon the presentation
of a reason that the court accepts as legally sufficient to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Defendants should be alert to any evi-
dence from which it can be inferred that it was the "reason,"
rather than age, that motivated the defendant's action.
V. THE FINAL STEP: JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND FACTUAL
RESOLUTION
M See Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30, 35-36 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 97 (1982); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (7th
Cir. 1977); Sime v. Trustee of Cal. State Univ., 526 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975).
,74 Such evidence might be evidence challenging the factual existence of the reason ar-
ticulated. For instance, a defendant may assert that the plaintiff was discharged for striking
a supervisor. The plaintiff may have evidence that such an event never took place. Or defen-
dant's articulated reason might be that the plaintiff had a criminal record. Plaintiffs might
produce evidence that no such criminal record exists and that there is no way defendant
should have believed such a record existed.
275 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978).
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A. The Legal Burdens Revisited
To this point the issues largely have been ones of law. Through-
out this Article evidence has been evaluated in terms of whether it
would be legally sufficient to support a necessary factual finding
on behalf of the party carrying the burden. If a party failed to
carry its assigned evidentiary burden, the court would be required,
as a matter of law, to grant a judgment to the opposing party with-
out resolving any factual issue of motivation. If, however, the par-
ties each satisfied their respective burdens at each of the steps in
the "judicial minuet"-1) plaintiff's prima facie case, 2) defen-
dant's articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, 3)
plaintiff's additional evidence of age motivation-the remaining is-
sue is one of ultimate fact to be resolved, in most cases, by a jury:
What was the mental attitude or motivation of the defendant at
the time it denied the plaintiff the employment opportunity? In
nonfederal employment cases the jury must be instructed.
B. Ultimate Burden of Persuasion: "Deciding Factor"
The burden of convincing the factfinder that the defendant was
motivated by the age of the plaintiff is a burden cast upon the
plaintiff. The defendant does not carry a burden of convincing the
factfinder that the articulated reason motivated its action.110 For a
court to suggest such a burden would be error.
In satisfying the plaintiff's burden of proof or, more properly,
the risk of nonpersuasion, the plaintiff need not convince the
factfinder that age was the sole factor in making the employment
decision. The plaintiff, however, must prove that age did more
than play some factor or was only remotely considered by the de-
fendant. Rather, the plaintiff must convince the factfinder by a
preponderance of the evidence that age was the "deciding factor,"
i.e., that had it not been for the plaintiff's age she would not have
been rejected. In short, the plaintiff must prove that "age made a
difference. 177 The jury should be so instructed as to the plaintiff's
1M6 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Kelly v.
American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 1981).
177 See Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lovelace v. Sherwin.
Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc.,
675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312,
1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982); Haring v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 664 F.2d 1234,
[Vol. 17:621668
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burden.
C. The Evidence: Appropriate Instructions
1. Introduction. The court should also aid the jury in its evalu-
ation of the evidence. In framing instructions there is no single,
invariably correct pattern to follow. Nevertheless, appellate courts
have cautioned trial courts to avoid technical legal phrases such as
"prima facie case," "presumption," and "shifted burden. 78
Rather, trial courts should instruct juries on the significance of the
various types of evidence in plain language.
2. Prima Facie Case. In addressing the evidence that is rele-
vant to the resolution of the ultimate factual issue of motivation,
the factfinder may consider the inference of age discrimination
that flows from the prima facie showing. That inference does not
"disappear" upon the presentation of the defendant's reason but
rather remains to be accorded the weight the factfinder deems ap-
propriate. 17 9 Before an inference of age discrimination can be
drawn, however, the factfinder must first conclude that the under-
lying facts necessary to create a prima facie case indeed do exist.
Thus, in instructing the jury the trial court should direct the jury's
attention to each of the elements of a prima facie case and, if con-
tested, should tell the jury that if, but only if, they find that each
of the elements exist-(1) the plaintiff is between forty and sev-
enty; (2) a vacancy existed; (3) the plaintiff sought the position; (4)
the plaintiff was qualified; (5) the plaintiff was rejected; and (6)
the position was filled by a substantially younger person-may
they then infer that the defendant was motivated by considera-
tions of the plaintiff's age.180 It would seem that the jury could be
told that they could consider the difference in age between the age
of the plaintiff and the age of the person favored to determine the
1239-40 (5th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979); cf. Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (Title VII nonjury
standard).
178 Haring v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 664 F.2d 1234, 1237 (6th Cir. 1981).
179 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10. The Court
rejected Professor Thayer's "bursting bubble" theory that once evidence is presented that
challenges the prima facie case the evidentiary value of the prima facie case is destroyed.
See J. THAYER, A PRELnmARY TRzATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAw 346 (1898).
180 Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1982).
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strength of that inference.181
3. The Defendant's Evidence. Similar to the basic factfinding
necessary to infer illegal motive from a prima facie case, there
must be preliminary factual findings concerning the existence of
the defendant's articulated reasons. The jurors can be told that
from the existence of articulated reasons they can infer that the
defendant was motivated by those reasons rather than by the
plaintiff's age. Nevertheless, before an inference of proper motiva-
tion can be drawn, it is necessary for the facts upon which that
inference is based first to exist. Thus, if the existence of the reason
articulated is placed in factual dispute by the plaintiff, the jury
should be instructed that it must first determine whether the ar-
ticulated reason exists.282 If the reason is found to exist, the jury
may be told that it may infer from this fact that the reason moti-
vated the action of the defendant. They should also be told the
converse of this proposition, however. If they find that the reason
proffered by the defendant does not in fact exist or that the defen-
dant did not in good faith believe it existed, 83 they may not infer
101 See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
12 For example, the defendant asserts as his "reason" that the plaintiff cursed a supervi-
sor. The plaintiff's version of the incident is that the plaintiff was silent and the supervisor
used the abusive language. Thus, the issue is whether plaintiff cursed or was believed to
have cursed. This issue can only be resolved by a credibility determination. If the jury finds
that the plaintiff did not curse or that the defendant did not believe the plaintiff cursed, the
jury cannot infer that the "reason"-cursing-motivated the discharge. In such a case the
prima facie case is unrefuted, and judgment should be for the plaintiff. See Peters v. Lioual.
len, 693 F.2d 966, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller v. WFLI Radio, Inc., 687 F.2d 136, 138-39
(6th Cir. 1982); Schulz v. Veterans Admin., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 209 (D.D.C.
1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e) (1982) ("When the exception of a 'reasonable factor other than
age' is raised against an individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears
the burden of showing that the 'reasonable factor other than age exists factually.' ") Contra
Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1982) (additional evidence of
age motivation is necessary to raise a factual issue of illegal motivation); Danzl v. North St.
Paul-Maplewood-Oadand Indep. School Dist., 663 F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
18 Reliance on the existence of an otherwise valid reason will be legitimate even if it is
later established that the reason did not actually exist. De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671
F.2d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1982). For example, if an employer believed in good faith that an
employee submitted false time cards and discharged the employee based on that belief, the
reason would be legitimate. That legitmacy is not destroyed if it is later discovered or
proved that the employee, in fact, was innocent of any wrongdoing. Turner v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1977). It is the subjective belief in the existence of
the objective reason that negates the inference of improperly motivated action. Thus, the
employer carried its burden of articulating a reason if the factfinder believes that the em-
ployer relied in good faith upon the existence of the reason.
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that the defendant's motivation was proper. In such a case they
should be instructed to return a verdict for the plaintiff.
The defendant's testimony that it was the articulated reason
that motivated its action and not age is relevant and can be given
the weight the witness's credibility warrants. The jury can be so
instructed. Further, should the defendant have statistical data that
indicate that persons of the plaintiff's age group have not been a
victim of disparate treatment, the jury should be told that from a
balanced work force and apparent even-handed treatment of older
workers they may infer that the plaintiff was not treated differ-
ently because of age. They should be cautioned, however, that such
evidence is not conclusive evidence of nondiscrimination in the
plaintiff's case of individual disparate treatment and that merely
because an employer has a balanced work force or has not discrim-
inated against others does not establish the absence of discrimina-
tory treatment of the plaintiff.
4. The Plaintiff's Additional Evidence. As to direct evidence of
improper motivation, such as notations, advertisements, or oral
statements, little comment is necessary save that this is evidence
of discriminatory motive to be considered with the inference flow-
ing from the plaintiff's initial showing. As to the inferences flowing
from comparative evidence, the jury can be instructed that proof
that the plaintiff was generally superior is some, but not conclu-
sive, evidence that the defendant was motivated by nonbusiness
concerns and that the existence of lesser discriminatory alterna-
tives (if they exist) that would better serve an employer's bona fide
needs (if it would) can be taken as some evidence that age may
have motivated the employer's decision. Again, a trial court may
need to caution the jury that the defendant is under no legal obli-
gation to select the "best" employee or utilize the least discrimina-
tory alternative and to emphasize that these factors are evidence
only of age motivation.
Regarding instructions on statistical showings, like the instruc-
tions given on the defendant's presentation, the jury must be told
that it can infer that this particular plaintiff was a victim of illegal
age discrimination from statistical evidence of wide-ranging dispa-
rate treatment. A finding of illegal motivation in the individual
case, however, is not required by statistical evidence that the
plaintiff's class is unfavorably treated by the defendant. In short,
the statistics permit only an inference of discriminatory motive;
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they do not require a finding thereof.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Most courts have adapted the Title VII standard for proof of
illegal discrimination to litigation under the ADEA. Under this
standard, most plaintiffs will find it relatively easy to establish a
prima facie case. In ADEA litigation, however, while following Ti-
tle VII formulations, the courts have been more lenient than Title
VII courts in evaluating what reasons will be deemed legally suffi-
cient to meet the standard of "legitimate" or "reasonable factors."
Extremely vague, conclusory, and subjective judgments have been
held to meet the defendant's evidentiary burden. Comparative ev-
idence is rarely demanded. Given the ease with which a defendant
can meet her burden, to get to the jury most plaintiffs will have to
present additional evidence, direct or circumstantial, of illegal mo-
tivation-evidence that goes beyond the bare prima facie showing.
If the plaintiff does not have any additional evidence, then the
likelihood of eventual success will be small. They should be so ad-
vised. Even when additional evidence of illegal motive is presented,
the result will not necessarily be success, however, because the case
probably will be resolved at the ultimate fact level by the jury. The
plaintiff must carry the substantial burden of persuasion on the
issue of the defendant's motivation. Predicting success when the
issue is one for jury resolution is at best a perilous business. Thus
most prospective plaintiffs will have to be advised that their case
will probably be resolved by a jury with no talisman for predicting
victory. Even strong showings of illegal motivation may not con-
vince a jury. And in spite of the strength of the plaintiff's case, if
the jury is correctly instructed and the reason articulated by the
defendant meets the weak legal standard of "legitimacy," the
chances of reversing an adverse finding on appeal are remote.
18 4
184 In reviewing a finding of the bona fides of a seniority system under Title VII, the
Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790 (1982), suggested that a
finding on motivation made by a trial judge was a finding of fact subject to reversal on
appeal only if "clearly erroneous." The lower federal courts are not in agreement as to how
this ruling on seniority affects findings of motivation in Title VII disparate treatment cases.
Some have interpreted Pullman-Standard to apply to all cases where motivation is at issue,
including disparate treatment cases, and to limit the scope of review of motive findings to
reversal only if "clearly erroneous." See Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 940
(11th Cir. 1983); Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 682 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Others believe that Pullman-Standard is applicable only to a determination of the booa
fides of seniority systems interposed as a defense under Title VII and thus should not
change the traditional scope of review when the issue is an employer's motivation in its
treatment of an individual plaintiff. Such courts would continue to hold that a finding of
motivation is an "ultimate legal fact" subject to more thorough review on appeal than un-
derlying or "basic facts." EEOC v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694
F.2d 531, 545 n.14 (9th Cir. 1982). Regardless of how this division is ultimately resolved in
Title VII nonjury cases, it seems clear that under the ADEA when a jury makes a finding of
motivation, that finding will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant can demonstrate
a clear lack of evidentiary support for the verdict. See Blackwell v. Sun Ele. Corp., 696
F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); Archambault v. United Computing Syss., 695 F.2d 551, 552
(11th Cir. 1983); see also Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir.
1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.) (recent examples of
appellate deference to jury verdicts), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
This deference to the jury finding reinforces the need for courts to be more attentive than
they have been in the past in evaluating the legal sufficiency of the plaintiflf' prima facie
case, defendants' showing of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason," and any additional
evidence from plaintiffs tending to suggest pretext. Only if at each stage can it be said that
the party's evidence supports an inference of motivation delegated to that party should the
court permit the issue to be submitted to the jury for final resolution.
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